# 1AC - Standard

## Part 1 is Framing

Debate cannot be a discussion of ideal theory- it must be a discussion of tangible policies to reduce oppression.

Curry 14, Tommy, The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century, Victory Briefs, 2014,

Despite the pronouncement of **debate** as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. ¶ This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

Thus the standard is minimizing oppression.

prefer

1. Ideal theory strips away particularities making ethics inaccessible and epistemologically skewed

Mills 05, Charles, 2005, Ideal Theory” as Ideology,

The crucial common claim—whether couched in terms of ideology and fetishism, or androcentrism, or white normativity—is that all theorizing, both moral and nonmoral, takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, norms, values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experience and group interests of the privileged group (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that “spontaneously” occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often be the case that dominant concepts will obscure certain crucial realities, blocking them from sight, or naturalizing them, while on the other hand, concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. This is, of course, the burden of standpoint theory—that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged (Harding 2003). The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group. In its ignoring of oppression, ideal theory also ignores the consequences of oppression. If societies are not oppressive, or if in modeling them we can abstract away from oppression and assume moral cognizers of roughly equal skill, then the paradigmatic moral agent can be featureless. No theory is required about the particular group-based obstacles that may block the vision of a particular group. By contrast, nonideal theory recognizes that people will typically be cognitively affected by their social location, so that on both the macro and the more local level, the descriptive concepts arrived at may be misleading.

Non-ideal theory necessitates consequentialism since instead of following rules that assume an already equal playing field; we take steps to correct material injustice.

## Part 2 is Advocacy

Plan text, Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict constitutionally protected speech that is used to criticize the military’s policies.

## Part 3 is Offense

Patriotic Correctness on campuses runs rampant- dissent is charged with treason and lines of critical thought are silenced. Higher education has been coopted by the military industrial complex, reducing the roles of teachers to mere technicians. Members of college campuses are routinely fired if they criticize the military, causing a chilling effect on such discussion. Multiple empirical examples prove:

Wilson 15, John K., Ph.D candidate with dissertation on the history of academic freedom in America and author of three books, “Patriotic Correctness: Academic Freedom and Its Enemies,” Routledge, Nov 30, 2015

Compared to earlier “wartime” situations, academic freedom is far more protected today than at any time in the past. But the danger posed to academic freedom cannot be ignored. Efforts to silence faculty and students, even when they are unsuccessful, can make others around the country more reluctant to speak openly. Only by denouncing all efforts at censorship and vigorously defending the right of freedom on college campuses, can we continue to protect academic freedom. The cliché of our times, constantly repeated but often true, is that 9/11 “changed everything.” One thing that it changed was academic freedom. The controversy over the limits of free speech on college campuses across the nation began immediately. On the morning of September 11, 2001, University of New Mexico history professor Richard Berthold joked with his class, “Anyone who would blow up the Pentagon would have my vote.” Berthold received death threats, keeping him off campus. On September 27, an unidentified person left a message on the provost’s voice-mail saying if Berthold were not “ousted” within 24 hours, Berthold would be ousted by other sources. Berthold was threatened in front of his home by a biker who came at him screaming obscenities, and he received several angry e-mails and letters with messages such as “I’d like to blow you up.” New Mexico state representative William Fuller declared,“Treason is giving aide or comfort to the enemy. Any terrorist who heard Berthold’s comment was comforted.” In the end, Berthold was pressured to retire from his job because of those 11 words he spoke on 9/11.Mohammad Rahat, an Iranian citizen and University of Miami medical technician who turned 22 years old on September 11, 2001, declared in a meeting that day, “Some birthday gift from Osama bin Laden.” Although Rahat said that he meant it “in a sarcastic way,” Rahat was suspended and then fired on September 25, 2001. Paula Musto, vice president of university relations, declared that Rahat’s “comments were deeply disturbing to his co-workers and superiors at the medical school. They were inappropriate and unbecoming for someone working in a research laboratory. He was fired because he made those comments, certainly not because of his ethnic background.” Rahat had received only positive evaluation in 13 months working in the lab. 6 At the University of California at Los Angeles, library assistant Jonnie Hargis was suspended without pay for one week after sending an e-mail response criticizing American policies in Iraq and Israel. Hargis’ union successfully pursued a grievance; Hargis was repaid for his lost income, the incident was stricken from his job record, and the university was forced to clarify its e-mail policies.7On September 13, 2001, two resident assistants in Minnesota complained to the dean of students that undergraduates felt fearful and uneasy because some professors questioned the competence of the Bush Administration. According to the resident assistants,“The recent attacks extend beyond political debate, and for professors to make negative judgments on our government before any action has taken place only fosters a cynical attitude in the classroom.” The administration asked faculty to think hard about what they said. Greg Kneser, dean of students, declared:“There were students who were just scared, and an intellectual discussion of the political ramifications of this was not helpful for them. They were frightened, and they look to their faculty not just for intellectual debate” but as “people they trust.”8 Even hypothetical discussions were suspicious. Portland Community College philosophy professor Stephen Carey challenged students in his critical thinking class to consider an extreme rhetorical proposition that would cause great emotion, like “Bush should be hung, strung up upside down, and left for the buzzards.” One student’s mother, misunderstanding the example, called the FBI and accused Carey of threatening to kill the President, and the Secret Service investigated him.9 When four leftist faculty at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill (UNC) criticized U.S. foreign policy at a teach-in, Scott Rubush of FrontPage magazine, declared, “They’re using state resources to the practical effect of aiding and abetting the Taliban.”The magazine recommended that these faculty be fired. “Tell the good folks at UNC–Chapel Hill what you think of their decision to allow anti-American rallies on their state-supported campus,” FrontPage urged. The administration received hundreds of angry e-mails, and was denounced on the floor of the North Carolina legislature. Several antiwar faculty members received death threats.10 In addition to phys i cal threats and attack s , A rab and Muslim students also faced enormous scru t i ny from the authori t i e s . An October 2001 survey by the Am e ri can Association of Collegiate Registrars and Ad m i s s i ons Officers found thatat least 220 colleges had been contacted by law enforcement in the weeks after 9/11. Police or FBI agents made 99 requests for private “n on - d i re c t o ry ”i n f o rm a t i on ,s u ch as course sch e d u l e s , that under law cannot be released without student con s e n t , a s u b p o e n a , or a pending danger (on ly 12 of the requests had a subpoena, a l t h o u g h the Immigra t i on and Na t u ra l i za t i on Se rvice doesn’t re q u i reconsent for inform a t i on on foreign students). Most requests were for individual students, although 16 requests for student re c o rds were “based on ethnicity. ” Law enforcement re c e i ve d the inform a t i on from 159 sch o o l s , and on ly eight denied any re q u e s t s . I n response to the violence and persecution against Muslim and Arab students, some colleges did try to restrict offensive speech in ways that resulted in threats to academic fre e d om . At Orange Coast Com mu n i ty College (OCC) on September 20, 2001, government professor Ken Hearlson was suspended for 11 weeks after Muslim students accused him of being biased against them and calling them “terrorists.” Hearlson denied the accusation. A tape recording of the class found that the most extreme statements were misheard, although Hearlson did apparently point a finger at Middle Eastern students while he blamed Arab countries for fomenting terrorism.11 In a case at Johns Hopkins University, Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), was demoted (but later reinstated) after a September 14 panel discussion on terrorism in which he criticized Iraq, Pakistan, and Palestinians.12 I n response to the violence and persecution against Muslim and Arab students, some colleges did try to restrict offensive speech in ways that resulted in threats to academic fre e d om . At Orange Coast Com mu n i ty College (OCC) on September 20, 2001, government professor Ken Hearlson was suspended for 11 weeks after Muslim students accused him of being biased against them and calling them “terrorists.” Hearlson denied the accusation. A tape recording of the class found that the most extreme statements were misheard, although Hearlson did apparently point a finger at Middle Eastern students while he blamed Arab countries for fomenting terrorism.11 In a case at Johns Hopkins University, Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), was demoted (but later reinstated) after a September 14 panel discussion on terrorism in which he criticized Iraq, Pakistan, and Palestinians.12 Anti-military views expressed in an e-mail could put a professor’s job at risk. At Chicago’s St. Xavier University, history professor Peter Kirstein sent this response to an Air Force cadet asking him to help promote an Air Force event: “You are a disgrace to this country and I am furious you would even think I would support you and your aggressive baby killing tactics of collateral damage.” Although Kirstein apologized for his e-mail, many called for his dismissal. On November 15, 2002, St. Xavier president Richard Yanikoski announced that Kirstein would be immediately suspended, receive a reprimand, and undergo a post-tenure review during a Spring 2003 sabbatical.13 Another tenured professor was suspended for responding rudely to an unsolicited e-mail and saying that killing is wrong. While conservatives contended that a few cases of censorship proved that left-wing thought police rule over college campuses, my extensive survey of academic freedom and civil liberties at American universities found the opposite: left-wing critics of the Bush Administration suffered by far the most numerous and most serious violations of their civil liberties. Censorship of conservatives was rare, and almost always overturned in the few cases where it occurred. Patriotic correctness—not political correctness—reigned supreme after 9/11.

This is devastating because higher education is the uniquely key institution that can provide spaces for conversations and action that snowball into cultural shifts away from militarism. History proves, anti-military dissent has always been silenced when the State is hell-bent on imposing its agenda and quieting opposition. Voting aff helps teach students to refuse complicity with militarism

Jaschik and Giroux 07, Henry Giroux and Scott Jaschik, 'The University in Chains', (Interview), 2007, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/07/giroux

Q: How do you think the state of academic freedom has changed since 9/11? A: Criticisms of the university as a stronghold of dissent have a long and inglorious history in the United States, extending from attacks in the 19th century by religious fundamentalists to anti-communist witch-hunts conducted in the 1920s, 1930s, and again in the 1950s, during the infamous era of McCarthyism. Harkening back to the infamous McCarthy era, a newly reinvigorated war is currently being waged by Christian nationalists, reactionary neoconservatives, and corporate fundamentalists against the autonomy and integrity of all those independent institutions that foster social responsibility, critical thought, and critical citizenship. While the attack is being waged on numerous fronts, the universities are where the major skirmishes are taking place. What is unique about this attack on academic freedom are the range and scope of the forces waging an assault on higher education. It is much worse today, because corporations, the national security state, the Pentagon, powerful Christian evangelical groups, non-government agencies, and enormously wealthy right-wing individuals and institutions have created powerful alliances -- the perfect storm so to speak -- that are truly threatening the freedoms and semi-autonomy of American universities. Higher education in the United States is currently being targeted by a diverse number of right-wing forces that have assumed political power and are waging an aggressive and focused campaign against the principles of academic freedom, sacrificing critical pedagogical practice in the name of patriotic correctness and dismantling the ideal of the university as a bastion of independent thought, and uncorrupted inquiry. Ironically, it is through the vocabulary of individual rights, academic freedom, balance, and tolerance that these forces are attempting to slander, even vilify, an allegedly liberal and left-oriented professoriate, to cut already meager federal funding for higher education, to eliminate tenure, and to place control of what is taught and said in classrooms under legislative oversight. There is more at work in the current attack than the rampant anti-intellectualism and paranoid style of American politics outlined in Richard Hofstadter’s *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life,* written over 40 years ago. There is also the collective power of radical right-wing organizations, which in their powerful influence on all levels of government in spite of a democratically controlled Congress and most liberal social institutions feel compelled to dismantle the open, questioning cultures of the academy. Underlying recent attacks on the university is an attempt not merely to counter dissent but to destroy it and in doing so to eliminate all of those remaining public spaces, spheres, and institutions that nourish and sustain a culture of questioning so vital to a democratic civil society. Dissent is often equated with treason; the university is portrayed as the weak link in the war on terror by powerful educational agencies; professors who advocate a culture of questioning and critical engagement run the risk of having their names posted on Internet web sites while being labeled as un-American; and various right-wing individuals and politicians increasingly attempt to pass legislation that renders critical analysis a liability and reinforces, with no irony intended, a rabid anti-intellectualism under the call for balance and intellectual diversity. Genuine politics begins to disappear as people methodically lose those freedoms and rights that enable them to speak, act, dissent, and exercise both their individual right to resistance and a shared sense of collective responsibility. While higher education is only one site, it is one of the most crucial institutional and political spaces where democratic subjects can be shaped, democratic relations can be experienced, and anti-democratic forms of power can be identified and critically engaged. It is also one of the few spaces left where young people can think critically about the knowledge they gain, learn values that refuse to reduce the obligations of citizenship to either consumerism or the dictates of the national security state, and develop the language and skills necessary to defend those institutions and social relations that are vital to a substantive democracy. As the philosopher Hannah Arendt insisted, a meaningful conception of politics appears only when concrete spaces exist for people to come together to talk, think critically, and act on their capacities for empathy, judgment, and social responsibility. What the current attack on higher education threatens is a notion of the academy that is faithful to its role as a crucial democratic public sphere, one that offers a space both to resist the “dark times” in which we now live and to embrace the possibility of a future forged in the civic struggles requisite for a viable democracy.

2 impacts

### A. Cultural shift-

The aff teaches students to refuse the myth of militarism- this creates a cultural shift away from the glorification of violence

Chatterjee & Maira 14 [Piya Chatterjee, Backstrand Chair and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Scripps College, Sunaina Maira, Professor of Asian American Studies at UC Davis, “The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent,” University of Minnesota Press, 2014] JW

State warfare and militarism have shored up deeply powerful notions of patriotism, intertwined with a politics of race, class, gender, sexuality, and religion , through the culture wars that have embroiled the U.S. academy. The fronts of “hot” and “cold” wars—military, cultural, and academic— have rested on an ideological framework that has defined the “enemy” as a threat to U.S. freedom and democracy. This enemy produced and propped up in the shifting culture wars— earlier the Communist, now the (Muslim) terrorist— has always been both external and internal. The overt policing of knowledge production, exemplified by right-wing groups such as ACTA, reveals an ideological battle cry in the “culture wars” that have burgeoned in the wake of the civil rights movement— and the containment and policing demanded within the academy. Defending the civilizational integrity of the nation requires producing a national subject and citizen by regulating the boundaries of what is permissible and desirable to express in national culture— and in the university. As Readings observed, “In modernity, the University becomes the model of the social bond that ties individuals in a common relation to the idea of the nation-state.” 46 Belonging is figured through the metaphor of patriotic citizenship, in the nation and in the academy, through displays of what Henry Giroux has also called “patriotic correctness”: “an ideology that privileges conformity over critical learning and that represents dissent as something akin to a terrorist act.” 47 This is where the recent culture wars have shaped the politics of what we call academic containment. For right-wing activists, the nation must be fortified by an educational foundation that upholds, at its core, the singular superiority of Western civilization. A nation-state construed as being under attack is in a state of cultural crisis where any sign of disloyalty to the nation is an act of treachery, including acts perceived as intellectual betrayal. The culture wars have worked to uphold a powerful mythology about American democracy and the American Dream and a potent fiction about freedom of expression that in actuality contains academic dissent. This exceptionalist mythology has historically represented the U.S. nation as a beacon of individual liberty and a bulwark against the Evil Empire or Communist bloc ; Third Worldist and left insurgent movements, including uprisings within the United States in the 1960s and 1970s and in Central America in the 1980s; Islamist militancy and anti-imperial movements since the 1980s ; and the threat posed by all of these to the American “way of life.” The battle against Communism, anti-imperial Third Worldism, and so-called Islamofascism entailed regulating and containing movements sympathetic to these forces at home, including intellectuals with left-leaning tendencies and radical scholars or students— all those likely to contaminate young minds and indoctrinate students in “subversive” or “anti-American” ideologies.

Militarism is part of the culture, making people disposable- justifying and creating everyday violence against the Middle Eastern Other. The aff allows student and professors to refuse this culture.

Chatterjee & Maira 2 [Piya Chatterjee, Backstrand Chair and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Scripps College, Sunaina Maira, Professor of Asian American Studies at UC Davis, “The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent,” University of Minnesota Press, 2014] JW

The strategic co-optation of the language of pluralism for academic containment is nowhere more evident than in the assault on progressive scholarship in Middle East studies and postcolonial studies and in the intense culture wars over Islam, the War on Terror, and Israel-Palestine. The 9/ 11 attacks and the heightened Islamophobia they generated allowed Zionist and neoconservative groups to intensify accusations that progressive Middle East studies scholars and scholars critical of U.S. foreign policy were guilty of bias and “ one-sided” partisanship , as observed in accounts of censure, suspicion, and vilification by Abowd, De Genova, and Salaita. The post-9/ 11 culture wars conjured up new and not-sonew phantoms of enemies— in particular , the racialized specter of the “terrorist.” This figure, and the racial panic associated with it, has been sedimented in the national imaginary as synonymous with the “Muslim” and the “Arab” since the Iranian Revolution of 1978– 1979 and the First Intifada against Israeli occupation in the late 1980s. The War on Terror consolidated Orientalist caricatures of Muslim fanatics and Arab militants , but it is important to note that these also dredged up avatars of a historical logic of containment and annihilation of indigenous others. 59 The native, the barbarian, and the foreigner converge in this cultural imaginary that legitimizes violence against anti-Western, uncivilized regions incapable of democratic self-governance and that is produced by expert knowledge of other peoples and regions. The wars in Iraq and “Af-Pak” and the global hunt for terrorists entailed an intensified suspicion and scrutiny of ideologies that supported militant resistance or “anti-American” sentiments and necessitated academic research on communities that were supposedly “breeding grounds” for terrorism. The post-9/ 11 panic about Muslim terrorists and enemy aliens increasingly focused on the threat of “homegrown terrorism” as the War on Terror shifted its focus to “radicalized” communities within the United States, especially Muslim American youth. At the same time, as Godrej observes, the criminalization of those considered threats to national security has included the violent repression of Occupy activists and student protesters and indefinite detention authorized by the PATRIOT (Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act and the National Defense Authorization Act. Protests focused on higher education thus blur into dissent against U.S. warfare and the homeland security state in a climate of heightened campus securitization and university collaboration with the FBI in the interest of “public safety.” Anarchists are considered domestic terror threats to be contained, and Muslim or Arab American students (or faculty) who are also anarchists are subjected to multiple levels of containment and scrutiny, as suggested in the chapter by Falcón et al. Academic containment is clearly part of a larger politics of repression and policing in the national security state that affects faculty and students as well as the campus climate in general.

This outweighs

1. Root Cause- once violence becomes normalized, then anything including the neg impacts can occur and no one cares, making solving them impossible
2. Aggregation- Militarism impacts constantly occur which means they aggregate every single day. By the time the neg impacts occur- the aff will massively outweighs on magnitude.

### B. Political Spillover

Academics have used state resources and their own academic freedom to create positive policy change proving that liberalizing the university creates concrete material impacts

Slaughter 88 [Sheila Slaughter, associate professor in the Center for the Study of Higher Education and director of the Division of Educational Foundations and Administration, The University of Arizona, “Academic Freedom and the State: Reflections on the Uses of Knowledge,” The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 59, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1988), pp. 241-262] JW

In the 1960s and 1970s, definitions of academic knowledge began to broaden. The university curriculum came to include subjects previously treated only in an incidental way-black studies, women's stud- ies, ethnic studies, and multiculturalism. Even China studies reentered the curriculum. The works of Marxists, feminists, anar- chists, and critical thinkers were included in social science courses where more conventional thought had once dominated. Methodologi- cal debates raged: the very possibility of objective knowledge and value-free science was seriously questioned [20, 38]. The expanded, heavily state-funded university provided in large part the resource base for the growth of diverse forms of knowledge. Funds were available for the new departments and new courses, jour- nals, and library subscriptions. Professors were able to sustain these new areas with resources generated within the university. Professors representing broader forms of knowledge were able to make their presence felt in professional associations, many of which developed radical and feminist caucuses in the late 1960s and 1970s [9, 36]. Professors engaged in generating alternative forms of knowledge also exchanged expertise with those outside the university, often using the university as their primary resource base. These external groups contributed symbolic support, some resources and very often used professors' expertise to fuel reform. Professors developing expertise in complementarity with these groups usually offer ideological and technical alternatives to current policy. In the area of foreign policy, for example, professors have worked with a wide variety of external groups to curb United States interventionist policies in Central America, particularly in Nicaragua. In many cases, these groups do more than simply call for an end to war; they present carefully thought-out policy alternatives for the region. Thus, the Institute for Policy Stud- ies drew on a number of professors in writing Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America. A great many professors have endorsed this long-term development plan for the Caribbean Basin. Academics have exchanged expertise with the Institute for Food and Development Policy in attempts to help Central American countries become self-sustaining in terms of food production. organizations such as Americas Watch and Amnesty International of- fer resources for new forms of expertise in Central America as do religious organizations such as Witness for Peace and Pledge of Resis- tance. Central America is only a single instance. State-supported professors exchange expertise with a wide variety of external groups trying to change prevailing policy. Examples of such exchanges are seen in professorial work with critical intellectual centers such as Public In- terest Research Groups, the Council on Economic Priorities, and the Union for Radical Political Economics; with special interest groups such as nuclear disarmament and pro-choice organizations; and with religious groups trying to create new theologies.

## Part 4 is Theory

1. All theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard- the most recent empirics of late elim rounds show huge neg side bias

Adler 15, Are Judges Just Guessing? A Statistical Analysis of LD Elimination Round Panels by Steven Adler http://nsdupdate.com/2015/03/30/are-judges-just-guessing-a-statistical-analysis-of-ld-elimination-round-panels-by-steven-adler/

Yet a plausible objection here might be that maybe the elimination round data need to be further segmented. For instance, perhaps the data do not meet this randomization because judges can easily distinguish between winners and losers in early elimination rounds, which typically contain more-lopsided matchups, but that in late elimination rounds the decision is much murkier. In fact, I find some support for this hypothesis, though it may be an artifact of a smaller sample-size for this segment.To evaluate this hypothesis, I replicated the above analysis, but pared down to the 36 coded rounds that took place in quarterfinals or later. In these rounds, the Neg side-bias was even more pronounced, with Neg winning 61% of elimination rounds, so the ‘expected’ randomization rate on ballots to achieve such an overall win-rate would be 57% for the Neg and 43% for the Aff. This creates the following expected distribution, compared to the actual observed distribution for these late elimination rounds:

Also means presumption and permissibility flow aff- I did the better debating if the round is tied. But nothing in the case triggers presumption.

2. Vote aff if I win a counter-interp

a. AFF flex – negative has the ability to win on either layer so the aff needs the same ability in the 2ar. 2AR is too short to win a new shell and play defense against the 2NR theory arguments so the AFF needs reciprocal layers rather than adding more unreciprocal avenues. That’s not a problem in the long 2nr.

b. reciprocity- Only the neg can read T because only the aff has a burden to be topical. Thus the aff needs an RVI to compensate for the neg’s unique avenue to the ballot.

## Part 5 is Method

1. The aff deploys a heuristic to learn scenario planning- even if politics and colleges are bad, scenario analysis of policies is pedagogically valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills

Barma et al 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>)

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

2. Use epistemic modesty to evaluate the method debate- key to decision-making, in all other circumstances we use probability times magnitude to evaluate risk, that’s the definition of game theory. It would be inconsistent to do that here as well.

3. Contesting the policy focus on the AC is bad, prefer the AC framework as long as it is theoretically legitimate.

A: it moots 6 minutes of AC offense since it uplayers my offense, which destroys aff, ground.

B: Also means the neg never has to clash and engage with the aff which means they get superficial education.

C: Coopts all their offense- they can read their role of the ballot when their aff.

4. Aff isn’t roleplaying- I’m not pretending that I am the state, I am merely forming an opinion about what the state should do. For example, I can say that criminal ought not murder people without thinking that I am that criminal. Avoids the link and non-unique your offense, everyone forms opinions about the government.

5. We should focus on particular circumstances which best tackle material violence.

Pappas 16, Gregory Fernando, The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016

In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these problematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to practice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.

6. Root cause explanations of politics don’t exist- methodological pluralism is key to open up new ideas and avoid violence.

Bleiker 14 – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)

For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences.

# Frontlines- Case

## Util Adv – Science Research

#### Persecuting social science professors for “un-patriotic” speech spills over to the rest of the campus. Every historical empiric shows that this destroys scientific progress

Cole 05 [Jonathan Cole, Fellow of the American Academy since 1992, is the John Mitchell Mason Professor of the University at Columbia University, “Academic Freedom under Fire,” Daedalus, Vol. 134, No. 2, On Imperialism (Spring, 2005), pp. 5-17] JW \*brackets from original text

Most of the recent attacks on university professors have been leveled against social scientists and humanists. Many critics of the university seem to believe that sanctioning one group of professors will have no effect on those in other disciplines. This is dangerously naive, both in principle and in practice. The stakes are high. The destruction of university systems has historically been political ideology on the conduct of scholarly and scientific research. Defense of faculty members in the humanities and social sciences from external political pressure protects all members of the university community. History suggests that the natural sciences, too, can be infected by political pressures to conform to ideological beliefs. German universities still have not recovered from the catastrophe of 1933 when Hitler began to dismantle German science and technology by purging those researchers who did 'Jewish science.' Japanese universities were damaged immeasurably in the 1930s by the purging of dissident intellectuals. Soviet biology never fully recovered from the imposition of Lysenkoism into the biological sciences. Today, political pressure to include 'creationism' and theories of 'intelligent design' as alternatives to Darwinian evolution in the secondary school science curriculum has already led to a purging of Darwin's theory from the science curriculum in at least thirteen states. The National Academies of Sciences and the Union of Concerned Scientists have cataloged many examples of Bush administration interference with research and education. Consider just a few examples : Foreign students and scholars from 'suspect' nations are harassed and even denied entry into the United States without a scintilla of evidence that they are security risks. American professors are prevented from working with gifted foreign scientists and students. Open scholarly communication is impeded by policies designed to isolate nations supporting terrorism ; library and computer records are searched; political litmus tests are used by the Bush administration to decide who will serve on scientific advisory committees; and scientific reports whose content is inconsistent with the Bush administration's ideology have been altered. Even though the National Institutes of Health supported the research, some members of Congress almost succeeded in rescinding funding for projects on HIV/AIDS. Another recent bill, House Resolution 3077, almost succeeded in mandating direct government oversight of university 'area studies' programs (the bill passed the House but died in the Senate). These attacks should be related to still other threats to scientific inquiry. The USA PATRIOT Act and the Bioterrorism Defense Act have, for example, led to the criminal prosecution of Dr. Thomas Butler, one of the nation's leading experts on plague bacteria. Butler faced a fifteen count indictment for violating the Patriot Act's provision requiring reporting on the use and transport of specific biological agents and toxins that in principle could be used by bioterrorists. Butler was acquitted of all charges related to the Patriot Act, except for a minor one - his failure to obtain a transport permit for moving the bacteria from Tanzania to his Texas laboratory, as he had done for the past twenty years. However, while investigating Butler's work with plague bacteria, the FBI combed over everything in his lab at Texas Tech University, reviewed all of his accounts, and added on fifty-four counts of tax evasion, theft, and fraud unrelated to the Patriot Act. His conviction was based on the add-on counts. The upshot of all of this was that he lost his medical license, was fired from his job, and now, if he loses his appeal, faces up to nine years in jail. In another case, Attorney General John Ashcroft publicly targeted Dr. Steven J. Hatfill of Louisiana State University as "a person of interest" in the anthrax scare that followed 9/11. Al though Hatfill has never been charged with any crime, LSU fired him because of the accusation and intervention of the Justice Department. Other faculty members at other institutions have suffered through unannounced and intimidating visits from the FBI to their homes or campus offices. These crude efforts to enforce the Patriot Act have already had some serious consequences. Robert C. Richardson, whose work on liquid helium earned him a Nobel Prize in Physics, has described the atrophy of bioterror ism research at Cornell: The Patriot Act, which was passed after 9/11, has a section in it to control who can work on "select agents," pathogens that might be developed as bioweapons. At Cornell [before 9/11], we had something like 76 faculty members who had projects on lethal pathogens and something like 38 working specifically on select agents. There were stringent regulations for control of the pathogens - certain categories of foreign nationals who were not allowed to handle them, be in a room with them or even be aware of research results. So what is the situation now? We went from 38 people who could work on select agents to 2. We've got a lot less people working on interventions to vaccinate against small pox, West Nile virus, anthrax and any of 30 other scourges.5 Is our national security enhanced when the government turns our best immunology and biodefense laboratories into ghost towns?

## Case Extensions

### Solvency Politics

V K

Case resolves material violence and is a good idea. Slaughter 88 indicates the US withdrew its military presence from Nicaragua as a result of the aff and Wilson 2 indicates we don’t have this freedom in the status quo. Material impacts outweigh intellectual posturing—can’t do the alt if you are being shot in the streets.

Also means you can vote on the aff’s scholarship—we criticize millaitarism.

V DA

Extend the spillover impact—affirming increases checks on military action which empirically reduces violence—that’s the Slaughter 88 evidence which indicates the aff resulted in the US withdrawing from Nicaragua. This outweighs:

1. Scale—war causes mass death and suffering <MAKE COMPARITIVE>
2. Reversibility—no alt solvency for the damage that military presence does whereas <MAKE COMPARITIVE>

### Solvency Culture

#### V K

Case resolves material violence and is a good idea. Thesis of the 1AC is that allowing anti-military discourse shifts away from a culture that glorifies the military and leads to everyday violence against minority groups--that’s Chatterjee & Maira 1 and 14.

Also proves the aff is key to alt solvency

1. Militarism is used to stop revolutions- gosset
2. Militarism taints individuals mindsets so they militarizes the alt.

V DA

**Extend the culture impact—affirming challenges cultural mindsets towards militarism, which Chatterjee and Marie indicate is key to attacking politics of disposability that currently runs rampant.**

### Framing

Extend Giroux 13, the ROTB is to take back the university from militarism. This delinks their offense, it isn’t about just consequentialism but what pedagogy we should engage in. It says opening up everything for contestation is key, which means only my offense is relevant.

### Additional Solvency Cards

Chile empirically proves- the aff spillsover to real reform.

Williams 15, Jo, Remaking education from below: the Chilean student movement as public pedagogy, 2015, Australian Journal of Adult Learning

More than ever the crisis of schooling represents, at large, the crisis of democracy itself and any attempt to understand the attack on public schooling and higher education cannot be separated from the wider assault on all forms of public life not driven by the logic of the market (Giroux, 2003:7) “Fin al lucro en educación, nuestros sueños no les pertenecen” (end profit making in education, nobody owns our dreams 1 ) (slogan of the Chilean student movement, inspired by the French student uprisings of May-June 1968) Over the past four decades, as the economic and ideological depravity of neoliberal policy and its market-driven logic (D. W. Hursh & Henderson, 2011) has been brought to bear on every aspect of education, the very concept of ‘public’ has been negated. Characteristics such as user-pays, competition, assaults on teachers, and mass standardised-testing and rankings, are among the features of a schooling, which is now very much seen as a private rather than public good (Giroux, 2003). The question of public education as a democratic force for the radical transformation of a violently unjust society seems rarely if ever asked, and a dangerous co-option and weakening of the language and practice of progressive pedagogy has occurred to the extent that notions of inclusion and success are increasingly limited to narrowly conceived individualist and competitive measures of market advantage. As Giroux notes “the forces of neo-liberalism dissolve public issues into utterly privatised and individualistic concerns (2004:62), and despite ongoing official rhetoric “the only form of citizenship increasingly being offered to young people is consumerism” (2003:7). Neoliberal education sees students and young people as passive consumers, the emphasis of schooling on learning how to be governed rather than how to govern (Giroux, 2003:7). In such a context the space for a public pedagogy, based on challenging the hegemony of neoliberal ideology and aligned with collective resistance, appears limited at best. And yet, every day people, teachers, students and communities do engage in political struggle, enacting pedagogies that seek to unveil rather than continue to mask the political structures and organisation that ensures power remains in the hands of the few, and at the service of the few, at the expense of the rest of us. Giroux characterises public pedagogies as defined by hope, struggle and a politicisation of the education process. He argues for …a politics of resistance that extends beyond the classroom as part of a broader struggle to challenge those forces of neo-liberalism that currently wage war against all collective structures capable of defending vital social institutions as a public good (Giroux, 2003:14). Central to Giroux’s argument is the need for critical educators to look to, value, and engage in and with social movements as they emerge and develop as sites of resistance. To …take sides, speak out, and engage in the hard work of debunking corporate culture’s assault on teaching and learning, orient their teaching for social change, connect learning to public life [and] link knowledge to the operations of power (Giroux, 2004:77). He argues that “[p]rogressive education in an age of rampant neoliberalism requires an expanded notion of the public, pedagogy, solidarity, and democratic struggle” (Giroux, 2003:13), and that moreover, educators need to work against a “politics of certainty” and instead develop and engage in pedagogical practice that problematises the world and fosters a sense of collective resistance and hope (2003:14). A neoliberal vision of the ‘good citizen’ and ‘good student’ presumes passivity, acceptance of the status quo and an individualistic disposition. Critical pedagogues must seek out and embrace opportunities to support and celebrate collective political action, not only because it develops a sense of social and political agency but also because it constitutes a powerful basis for authentic learning and active and critical citizenship in an unjust world (Freire, 1970). The Chilean student movement stands as one such example of challenging and inspiring counter-practice and a reclaiming of pedagogy as political and public. For ten years students have filled Chile’s streets, occupied their schools and universities, and organised conferences, public Remaking education from below: the Chilean student movement as public pedagogy 499 meetings, political stunts, creative actions and protests. Students and young people have been at the centre of the largest and most sustained political action seen in Chile since the democratic movement of the 80s, which eventually forced out the Pinochet dictatorship. Despite global trends in the opposite direction, the Chilean students have fundamentally influenced a nationwide education reform program constituting significant changes to the existing system which has been described as an extreme example of market-driven policy (Valenzuela, Bellei, & Ríos, 2014:220). Most importantly, they have forced and led a nationwide dialogue on the question of education and social justice in Chile and an interrogation of the current, grossly inequitable and elitist model (Falabella, 2008). This article begins by reviewing the experiences of the Chilean student movement to date and offering a brief explanation of the historical development of the education system it seeks to dismantle. It then considers the movement as an example of public pedagogies, concluding with a discussion of how it might inform notions of radical educational practice and a return of the student and pedagogue as authentic and critical subjects.

Empowering academics is uniquely key to disrupting the culture of militarism in universities. The only way the system survives is if academia continues to produce scholarship uncritical of it

Chatterjee & Maira 3 [Piya Chatterjee, Backstrand Chair and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Scripps College, Sunaina Maira, Professor of Asian American Studies at UC Davis, “The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent,” University of Minnesota Press, 2014] JW

In a post-9/ 11 world, the U.S. university has become a particularly charged site for debates about nationalism, patriotism, citizenship, and democracy. The “crisis” of academic freedom emerges from events such as the ones we witnessed in Riverside and Davis but also in many other campuses where administrative policing flexes its muscles along with the batons, chemical weapons, and riot gear of police and SWAT teams and where containment and censorship of political critique is enacted through the collusion of the university, partisan off-campus groups and networks, and the state. After 9/ 11, we have witnessed a calamitously repressive series of well-coordinated attacks against scholars who have dared to challenge the national consensus on U.S. wars and overseas occupations. Yet there has been stunningly little scholarly attention paid to this policing of knowledge, especially against academics who have dared to challenge the national consensus on U.S. wars and overseas occupations and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Simultaneously, the growing privatization of the public university, as in California, has demonstrated the ways in which the gates of access to public higher education are increasingly closed and the more subtle ways in which dissident scholarly and pedagogical work (and their institutional locations) is delegitimized and— in particularly telling instances— censored at both public and private institutions. The 9/ 11 attacks and the crises of late capitalism in the global North have intensified the crisis of repression in the United States and also the ongoing restructuring of the academy— as well as resistance to that process— here as well as in the global South. 2 What does it mean, then, to challenge the collusion of the university with militarism and occupation, the privatization of higher education, and economies of knowledge from within the U.S. university? When scholars and students who openly connect U.S. state formation to imperialism, war, and racial violence are disciplined, then how are we to understand freedom , academic and otherwise? How is post-9/ 11 policing and surveillance linked to racial, gendered, and class practices in the neoliberal academy? Has the War on Terror simply deepened a much longer historical pattern of wartime censorship and monitoring of intellectual work or is this something new? This edited volume offers reports from the trenches of a war on scholarly dissent that has raged for two or three decades now and has intensified since 9/ 11, analyzed by some of the very scholars who have been targeted or have directly engaged in these battles. The stakes here are high. These dissenting scholars and the knowledges they produce are constructed by right-wing critics as a threat to U.S. power and global hegemony, as has been the case in earlier moments in U.S. history, particularly during the Cold War. Much discussion of incidents where academics have been denied tenure or publicly attacked for their critique of U.S. foreign or domestic policies, as in earlier moments, has centered on the important question of academic freedom. However, the chapters in this book break new ground by demonstrating that what is really at work in these attacks are the logics of racism, warfare, and nationalism that undergird U.S. imperialism and also the architecture of the U.S. academy. Our argument here is that these logics shape a systemic structure of repression of academic knowledge that counters the imperial, nation-building project. The premise of this book is that the U.S. academy is an “imperial university.” As in all imperial and colonial nations, intellectuals and scholarship play an important role— directly or indirectly, willingly or unwittingly— in legitimizing American exceptionalism and rationalizing U.S. expansionism and repression, domestically and globally. The title of this book, then, is not a rhetorical flourish but offers a concept that is grounded in the particular imperial formation of the United States, one that is in many ways ambiguous and shape-shifting. 3 It is important to note that U.S. imperialism is characterized by deterritorialized, flexible, and covert practices of subjugation and violence and as such does not resemble historical forms of European colonialism that depended on territorial colonialism. 4 As a settler-colonial nation, it has over time developed various strategies of control that include proxy wars, secret interventions, and client regimes aimed at maintaining its political, economic, and military dominance around the globe, as well as cultural interventions and “soft power.” The chapters here help to illuminate and historicize the role of the U.S. university in legitimizing notions of Manifest Destiny and foundational mythologies of settler colonialism and exceptional democracy as well as the attempts by scholars and students to challenge and subvert them. This book demonstrates the ways in which the academy’s role in supporting state policies is crucial, even— and especially—as a presumably liberal institution. Indeed, it is precisely the support of a liberal class that is always critical for the maintenance of “benevolent empire.” 5 As U.S. military and overseas interventions are increasingly framed as humanitarian wars— to save oppressed others and rescue victimized women— it is liberal ideologies of gender, sexuality, religion, pluralism, and democracy that are key to uphold. 6 The university is a key battleground in these culture wars and in producing as well as contesting knowledges about the state of the nation.

#### The security state operates on a binary where people are either complacent allies or dissenters to be suppressed at all costs – by framing unsavory speech acts as coming from people who are our equals and share more similarities than differences rather than evil “Others” to be destroyed, the affirmative avoids cooption of “protection” movements and the antagonisms that drive war. Anything other than complete rejection hyperlinks to the impacts of the AFF.

Ivie 5 [Robert L. Ivie – PhD in Rhetoric and Communication at WashU, “Democratic Dissent and the Trick of Rhetorical Critique”, “Dissent as a Form of Struggle” – entire section, pg. 279 – 280, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.832.4092&rep=rep1&type=pdf]

Democracy’s formidable challenge may be most clearly indicated on the occasion of war. War, in its purest form, signals the presence of an enemy to coerce, combat, and destroy, not an adversary with whom to contend, negotiate, and coexist politically. Democracy consists most distinctly of relations of contestation among political adversaries, not hostilities between sheer enemies. War and democracy are therefore divergent and alternative forms of struggle. Yet, as forms of struggle, they are also convergent and confounding experiences in the sense that war co-opts and degrades democracy, except when democracy – its culture, practice, and institutions – is strong enough to resist the concocting of relations of utter animosity that incite warfare. An attitude of war reduces critics to enemies who must be coerced more or less into silence and submission. In war, one is either an ally or an enemy, with little or no room for neutrality or loyal opposition. By contrast, an attitude of democracy encourages dissent as a form of struggle among adversaries who are not sheer enemies. Purporting to defend democracy by silencing dissent undercuts democracy just as privileging democratic dissent and deliberation increases the incentive to address rather than subdue domestic critics and alien Others. In this way, a healthy democratic polity constitutes a constraint on war rather than an incentive or excuse for war, a presumption for inclusive relations of difference and contestation rather than exclusive relations of hostility and domination. War in the name of democracy is a sign of a democracy’s weakness rather than its strength and an expression of little faith in its potential to manage the human divide. At its best, democracy converts hostilities into constructive relations of consubstantial rivalry and political contestation, which makes war more difficult to motivate under less-than-compelling circumstances and more closely scrutinized even when it is perceived as unavoidable or otherwise justified. Where war reduces the image of a rival to the figure of pure enmity, democracy seeks to articulate more complex characterizations of adversaries that consist of differences intermixed with similarities. Points of identification constructed in democratic discourse serve to bridge divisive distinctions well enough to sustain political relations without effacing the boundaries that mark separate and opposed identities. Dissent is therefore a mainstay – not a luxury, a nuisance, or a malfunction – of democratic governance. It serves as the medium of productive competition without which there would be no play of differences, no way of holding delimited perspectives sufficiently accountable to one another, and no means of accommodating to a pluralism of opinions, interests, identities, and diverging orientations or of exercising judgment and acting on decisions at a given point in time while remaining responsive to changing circumstances, unresolved disagreements, and continuing uncertainties. The political is the realm of conflict and diversity, what Chantal Mouffe (2000, p. 101) discerned as the antagonism endemic to social relations, and politics is the ongoing effort to achieve an order of coexistence within a context of continuing conflict and contestation. Without dissent, there is no democratic polity of adversaries and thus no politics, only forced unity and unmitigated enmity that is the end of politics, per se. The depoliticized alternatives to dissent are submissive quiescence and violent resistance, neither of which is fitting for democracy understood as collective self-rule. Under an ongoing condition of war and terror, where democratic institutions, culture, and practices are diminished, government stifles dissent in the name of protecting democracy from itself and its enemies. Dissenters are marked with the sign of the domestic enemy and accused of weakening the nation from within, of making the homeland vulnerable to foreign enemies. Branded as a disuniting force and as traitors to a just cause, they are regarded with hostility rather than acknowledged as a loyal opposition of legitimate adversaries or recognized as a constructive influence, a safeguard against simplistic thinking and destructive, even self-defeating, exploits, and an abiding source of democratic strength.5 Indeed, dissent is a practical, if underappreciated, necessity in a complex and volatile world. It is anything but an inconvenience to democratic governance or a detriment to managing the human divide but instead an optimal medium of collective self-rule—a declination from tyranny and terror, coercion and violence. Dissent is normal to strong democratic practice and a sign of real political health, not of dysfunction or failure. Its modus operandi in a robust and open political system is vigorous debate and engaged deliberation. It is a rowdy affair (Ivie, 2002, pp. 277-285). When debate inside and outside of formal channels of deliberation is insufficiently engaged, dissent defaults to myriad forms of protest that interlace poetic complaints with provocative speech and that resort to symbolic acts of resistance and even violence. The likelihood of political struggle escalating beyond dissent into acts of violence and armed rebellion increases to the extent that authorities dismiss protest as merely the venting of public steam or suppress it in the name of order and safety. Democracy, that is, requires due regard for rhetorical struggle on issues of consequence and about differences of magnitude if politics is to prevail over alienation. Whether it takes the form of deliberating or demonstrating, debating or protesting, the rhetoric of dissent channels social struggle into political contestation (contra rebellion or capitulation) not just by representing formations of difference but also by articulating similarities into points of contact or convergence that cross established boundaries. Identification, as Kenneth Burke (1950/1969, p. 22) observed, compensates for division but does not displace it, for division is endemic to human relations. As identification’s ironic counterpart, division constitutes the factional basis of the partisan scramble that motivates communication. If political actors, as individuals and groups, were not separate and distinct from one another, there would be no need to articulate common ground or to achieve sufficient cohesion to avoid relations of sheer antagonism. Dissent, like other forms of rhetoric or symbolic action, walks a wavering line between division and identification, inducing cooperation among factions where otherwise victimization occurs all too readily and leads seemingly effortlessly to murder and war. Fashioning political rivals as consubstantial in some manner of speaking makes them joined but separate, identified though distinct, and communicative yet polemical. Consubstantiality is an attitude or way of acting together in our separateness at multiple levels of social organization (Burke, 1950/1969, pp. 21-23, 43-46). Consubstantial rivalry, in this sense, is paradigmatic of democratic dissent and engaged citizenship. It is a trope for enhancing democratic practice under increasingly widespread conditions of difference and division, of communicating across the political divide without effacing rival identities, and of articulating hierarchical relationships that are complex, interdependent, multilateral, delimited, and mutable rather than fixed orders of unilateral domination.6 Yet an exigency of war and terror presses hard against polemics of any kind when patriotism is measured by a standard of political conformity instead of democratic contestation. Dissent is most difficult to carry out at the point of greatest tension in human affairs and when it could especially benefit the political process. Periods of war and crisis reveal how deeply democracy is invested in dissent to maintain its own vitality and viability—indeed, its very ethos. Usually, the lesson is learned retrospectively by way of negative examples after dissent has been suppressed and democracy curtailed in the name of national security. A question, therefore, that is of some immediacy and import for enhancing constructive democratic agonistics and, by extension, for reducing enticements to war is how dissent can be sustained against expectations of conformity and the narrowing of political vision. What, in short, are the heuristics of dissent that constitute democratic practice when it is otherwise curtailed and constrained by a regime of crisis and war?

## AT Case Turns

### AT Marketplace of Ideas Top Level

1. These turns miss the boat- 1AC solvency isn’t about spillover. It is about ending the silencing of dissent, which screws over for protesting militarism.
2. Even if no one becomes anti-military advocates, the plan makes them more critical citizens by opening up a new viewpoint, that’s Evans and Giroux.

### AT Polarization Theory

1. might be true in abstract but not in educational spaces- students come to college specifically to learn so they will be willing to modify their ideas.
2. (empirics)

### AT Gov controls speech

1. Vietnam war and empirics from the 1AC deny, these professors aren’t arrested or stopped by the government. The college has ultimate jursidction, which the plans solves.
2. Non-unique- this is about the clear and present danger issues of the squo which means only the aff has a risk of solving
3. Turn- this is the type of thing the aff stops- we say colleges should stop using these restrictions.
4. Impact turn- causes a fight back, angry at government interference.

### AT Socialized Against Dissent

1. not in the context of militarism- it isn’t a view only held by hippies so they won’t focus just on delivery, it is mainstream enough.
2. Not with professors who are educators and thus have trusted knowledge.

### AT Truth doesn’t reign out

1. try or die- dissent is totally silenced now, it could only get better by letting them talk about it

## Niemi Extension

Extend niemi- semantic considerations are racist because they deem certain dialogues as correct and exclude all others. Thus other races with other dialogues are told to get out of debate.

This is a voting issue regardless of the flow, this is a teachable moment.

Vincent 13, Chris, Re-Conceptualizing our Performances: Accountability in Lincoln Douglas Debate, Vbriefly, 2013.

The question then becomes how does our discourse justify what we believe? For many debaters it is the gaming aspect of debate that allows us to assume that our speech can be disconnected from the speech act. The speech can be defined as the arguments that are placed on the flow, and is evaluated in the context of what is the most logical and rational argument to win the round. The critical distinction is the speech act, which is the performance of that discourse. It’s not what you say, but what you justify. Understanding the speech act requires critically assessing the ramifications of the debaters discourse. Debate is in and of itself a performance. To claim that it is not is to be divorced from the reality of what we do. We must evaluate what a debaters performance does and justifies. For white debaters it is easy to view the discourse as detached from the body. For those with privilege in debate, they are never forced to have their performance attached to them but instead their arguments are viewed as words on paper. They are taught to separate themselves from any ideologies and beliefs, and feel that there is no consequence to what they say. It becomes the way in which they justify what is deemed as “rational” and “logical” thought. The argument sounds like it will be competitive so it is read but it is deemed as just an argument. Judges evaluate this as just a speech. This becomes what I deem as a performance by the body, rather than a performance of the body. Performances by the body allow debaters to not be held accountable to the words they say. Words are seen as divorced from any meaning outside of the flow, versus the performance of the body where the words are attached to the body itself. Debaters often insert the performance by the body, when they make arguments that they claim that they do not believe, but think it is the best strategy for the round. This is a false assumption, since for black debaters meaning is always connected to their bodies. The best strategy should never be one that at the same time justifies acts of racism. Charles Mills argues that “the moral concerns of African Americans have centered on the assertion of their personhood, a personhood that could generally be taken for granted by whites, so that blacks have had to see these theories from a location outside their purview.” For example, I witnessed a round at a tournament this season where a debater ran a utilitarianism disadvantage. His opponent argued that this discourse was racist because it ignores the way in which a utilitarian calculus has distorted communities of color by ignoring the wars and violence already occurring in those communities. In the next speech, the debater stood up, conceded it was racist, and argued that it was the reason he was not going for it and moved on, and still won the debate. This is problematic because it demonstrates exactly what Mill’s argument is. For the black debater this argument is a question of his or her personhood within the debate space and the white debater was not held accountable for the words that are said. Again for debaters of color, their performance is always attached to their body which is why it is important that the performance be viewed in relation to the speech act. Whites are allowed to take for granted the impact their words have on the bodies in the space. They take for granted this notion of personhood and ignore the concerns of those who do not matter divorced from the flow. It is never a question of “should we make arguments divorced from our ideologies,” it is a question of is it even possible. It is my argument that our performances, regardless of what justification we provide, are always a reflection of the ideologies we hold. Why should a black debater have to use a utilitarian calculus just to win a round, when that same discourse justifies violence in the community they go back home to? Our performances and our decisions in the round, reflect the beliefs that we hold when we go back to our communities. As a community we must re-conceptualize this distinction the performance by the body and of the body by re-evaluating the role of the speech and the speech act. It is no longer enough for judges to vote off of the flow anymore. Students of color are being held to a higher threshold to better articulate why racism is bad, which is the problem in a space that we deem to be educational. It is here where I shift my focus to a solution. Debaters must be held accountable for the words they say in the round. We should no longer evaluate the speech. Instead we must begin to evaluate the speech act itself. Debaters must be held accountable for more than winning the debate. They must be held accountable for the implications of that speech. As educators and adjudicators in the debate space we also have an ethical obligation to foster an atmosphere of education. It is not enough for judges to offer predispositions suggesting that they do not endorse racist, sexist, homophobic discourse, or justify why they do not hold that belief, and still offer a rational reason why they voted for it. Judges have become complacent in voting on the discourse, if the other debater does not provide a clear enough role of the ballot framing, or does not articulate well enough why the racist discourse should be rejected. Judges must be willing to foster a learning atmosphere by holding debaters accountable for what they say in the round. They must be willing to vote against a debater if they endorse racist discourse. They must be willing to disrupt the process of the flow for the purpose of embracing that teachable moment. The speech must be connected to the speech act. We must view the entire debate as a performance of the body, instead of the argument solely on the flow. Likewise, judges must be held accountable for what they vote for in the debate space. If a judge is comfortable enough to vote for discourse that is racist, sexist, or homophobic, they must also be prepared to defend their actions. We as a community do not live in a vacuum and do not live isolated from the larger society. That means that judges must defend their actions to the debaters, their coaches, and to the other judges in the room if it is a panel. Students of color should not have the burden of articulating why racist discourse must be rejected, but should have the assurance that the educator with the ballot will protect them in those moments. Until we re-conceptualize the speech and the speech act, and until judges are comfortable enough to vote down debaters for a performance that perpetuates violence in the debate space, debaters and coaches alike will remain complacent in their privilege. As educators we must begin to shift the paradigm and be comfortable doing this. As a community we should stop looking at ourselves as isolated in a vacuum and recognize that the discourse and knowledge we produce in debate has real implications for how we think when we leave this space. Our performances must be viewed as of the body instead of just by it. As long as we continue to operate in a world where our performances are merely by bodies, we will continue to foster a climate of hostility and violence towards students of color, and in turn destroy the transformative potential this community could have.

Outweighs fiat is illusory- the representations that we endorse in round have actual effects on the real world.

# Frontlines- DA

## AT Morale DA

#### Morale is extremely low now and soldier pay is the root cause which the status quo doesn’t solve

Lockie 15 [Alex Lockie, writer for Business insider, “US military morale is reportedly at 'rock bottom' again,” Business Insider, July 1, 2015, <http://www.businessinsider.com/us-military-morale-at-rock-bottom-and-sinking-further-2015-6>] JW

Since 2009, $287 million has been spent on programs aimed at improving morale within the US military, which has shouldered two major overseas combat deployments over the past decade. But these efforts may have been largely fruitless, as 52% of soldiers across all branches remain "pessimistic about their future in the military," according to an April USA Today report. For decades, analysts have consistently reported on supposedly declining US military morale, even before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. A Brookings Institution report notes: "Observers regularly fretted over low morale during the defense drawdown of the 1990s, during the start of the Iraq War, during the Iraq Surge, during the Afghanistan Surge; and at practically all the points in between ... After each report of troop morale hitting 'rock bottom,' troop morale seems to slip lower yet and, still, the military soldiers on." In the past, flagging morale may have been attributable to factors like repeated Iraq or Afghanistan deployments. But a 2014 Military Times study suggests a financial cause for flagging morale: "In 2009, 87 percent of active-duty troops who participated in Military Times' survey rated their pay and allowances 'good' or 'excellent,'" the newspaper reported. "This year, the figure was just 44 percent." The US government increased military pay just 1 percent in 2014, the smallest hike in 41 years and down from a 3.9 percent raise in 2009 and a 6.9 percent jump in 2002, according to the Military Times.

## AT Hate Speech DA

1. Turn: the aff decreases hate speech. “Patriotic correctness” is what justifies Islamophobia and discrimination against anyone who fits the stereotype of the “dangerous middle eastern other.”
2. No link- aff only defends speech that criticizes the military- not hate speech. Even if we grant you a link it is comparatively tiny.

3. Traditional arguments regarding structural violence get co-opted by the political right in favor of tokenism that allows the university to claim moral righteousness. The aff is a necessary pre-req to resolving any structural abuses in the university

Chatterjee & Maira 14 [Piya Chatterjee, Backstrand Chair and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Scripps College, Sunaina Maira, Professor of Asian American Studies at UC Davis, “The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent,” University of Minnesota Press, 2014] JW

In effect, the neoliberal structuring of the university is also a racial strategy of management of an increasingly diverse student population, as increasing numbers of minority and immigrant students have entered public higher education. Well-funded, neoconservative organizations and partisan groups, such as ACTA, David Horowitz’s Freedom Center, and Campus Watch, have placed ethnic studies, feminist and queer studies, and critical cultural studies in their bull’s-eye as the political project of leftist professors running amok in the academy and teaching biased curricula. In addition, campaigns such as Horowitz’s Academic Bill of Rights and Student Bill of Rights constructed the figure of a new victim in the culture wars: the “American student” whose freedom to challenge these partisan faculty had been suppressed .56 According to these right-wing campaigns, “radical” scholars were force-feeding U.S. college students with antiAmerican views, and right-wing students were being marginalized and “discriminated” against due to their political ideology and affirmative action programs. Thus the language of marginalization and exclusion was turned on its head, as the discourse of right-wing victimhood and ideological discrimination was unleashed against the political movements and intellectual projects that opposed racial and class inequality. In addition, the right appropriated the language of “diversity,” a key point of contradiction in the academic culture wars. For example, the “Students for Academic Freedom” campaign launched by Horowitz used the notion of “intellectual pluralism” to mask its well-orchestrated attack on the left. 57 The cultural right manufactured a portrait of itself as the true advocate of intellectual pluralism and freedom, remaking diversity through a “free market” model based on the right to choice in the marketplace of ideas. 58 The notion of choice, central to models of flexible accumulation and global economic competitiveness for proponents of neoliberal capitalism, underlies the tenet of intellectual choice. A “weak” multiculturalism and liberal notion of tolerance thus served the right well, for they used it to argue that the problem was not simply that of “diversity,” which they apparently embraced, but that there wasn’t enough “intellectual diversity” on college campuses. Teaching, and also research, was becoming one-sided, to the detriment of those upholding “true” American values, who were increasingly marginalized in hotbeds of left indoctrination into anti-Americanism on college campuses. In addition, as Pulido’s case study demonstrates, as faculty and administrators of color—not to mention women— have made their way into the ranks of university management, academic institutions can hide behind the language of racial (and gender) representativeness and tokenist inclusion to deflect critiques of systemic problems with faculty governance.

Opening up dialogue makes it possible to recapture speech and turn it into a tool of validation for oppressed groups. Re-appropriation of the word “queer” empirically proves this

Butler 97**, [Judith, 1997, *Excitable Speech*. New York, NY: Routledge, CJS]**

Neither view can account for the restaging and resignifying of offensive utterance, deployments of linguistic power that seek at once to expose and counter the offensive exercise of speech. I will consider these at greater length in the chapters to come, but consider for a nioment how often such terms are subject to resignification. Such a redoubling of injurious speech takes place not only in rap music and in various forms of political parody and satire, but in the political and social critique of such speech, where "mentioning"10 those very terms is crucial to the arguments at hand, and even in the legal arguments that make the call for censorship, in which the rhetoric that is deplored is invariably proliferated within the context oflegal speech. Paradoxi- cally, the explicit legal and political arguments that seek to tie such speech to certain contexts fail to note that even in their own discourse, such speech has become citational, breaking with the prior contexts of its utterance and acquiring new contexts for which it was not intended. The critical and legal discourse on hate speech is itself a restaging of the performance of hate speech. The present discourse breaks with the prior ones, but not in any absolute sense. On the contrary, the present context and its apparent "break" with the past are themselves legible only in terms of the past from which it breaks. The present context does, however, elaborate a new context for such speech, a future con- text, not yet delineable and, hence, not yet precisely a context. The arguments in favor of a counter-appropriation or restaging of offensive speech are clearly undercut by the position that the offensive effect of the speech act is necessarily linked to the speech act, its origi- nating or enduring context or, indeed, its animating intentions or orig- inal deployments. The revaluation of terms such as "queer" suggest that speech can be "returned" to its speaker in a different form, that it can be cited against its originary purposes, and perform a reversal of effects. More generally, then, this suggests that the changeable power of such terms marks a kind of discursive performativity that is not a discrete series of speech acts, but a ritual chain of resignifications whose origin and end remain unfixed and unfixable. In this sense, an "act" is not a momentary happening, but a certain nexus of temporal horizons, the condensation of an iterability that exceeds the moment it occasions. The possibility for a speech act to resignify a prior context depends, in part, upon the gap between the originating context or intention by which an utterance is animated and the effects it produces. For the threat, for instance, to have a future it never intended, for it to be returned to its speaker in a different form, and defused through that return, the meanings the speech act acquires and the effects it per- forms must exceed those by which it was intended, and the contexts it assumes must not be quite the \_same as the ones in which it originates (ifsuch an origin is to be found). Those who seek to fix with certainty the link between certain speech acts and their injurious effects will surely lament the open tem- porality of the speech act. That no speech act has to perform injury as its effect means that no simple elaboration of speech acts will provide a standard by which the injuries of speech might be effectively acljudicated. Such a loosening of the link between act and injury, however, opens up the possibility for a counter-speech, a kind of talking back, that would be foreclosed by the tightening of that link. Thus, the gap that separates the speech act from its future effects has its auspicious implications: it begins a theory of linguistic agency that provides an alternative to the relentless search for legal remedy. The interval between instances of utterance not only makes the repetition and resignification of the utterance possible, but shows how words might, through time, become disjoined from their power to injure and recontextualized in more affirmative modes. I hope to make clear that by affirmative, I mean "opening up the possibility of agency; where agency is not the restoration of a sovereign autonomy in speech, a replication of conventional notions of mastery.

## AT Protests/Endowments DA

1. Non-unique – the aff is only one more thing students can protest about, there are already thousands of protests going on. Round the link down to 0

2. Link turn and no uniquness- Alumni are decreasing donations because of lack of free speech.

Willinger 16, Jeremy [Adminstrator of Heterdox Academy, apolitically diverse group of social scientists, natural scientists, humanists, and other scholars who want to improve our academic disciplines and universities. We share a concern about a growing problem: the loss or lack of “viewpoint diversity.” When nearly everyone in a field shares the same political orientation, certain ideas become orthodoxy, dissent is discouraged, and errors can go unchallenged.], "Protests Rise and Donations Drop: Alumni reactions to campus trends," Heterodox Academy, 8-16-2016, http://heterodoxacademy.org/2016/08/16/protests-rise-and-donations-drop-alumni-reactions-to-campus-trends/,

Heterodox Academy was founded at a time during which issues of free speech and censorship were playing out on college campuses nationwide. While we appreciated the issues being brought to the table, many of us also marveled at the hostile and exclusionary methods used to bring them into focus. As it turns out, so did many alumni who have since decreased their support to many universities where these protests and requests for censorship were taking place. In a recent New York Times article “College Students Protest, Alumni’s Fondness Fades and Checks Shrink,” Anemona Hartocollis writes about the backlash from alumni as “an unexpected aftershock of the campus disruptions of the last academic year.” More than just a reaction, this is a repudiation of the tactics used by students and of the capitulation by administrators. From the piece: Alumni from a range of generations say they are baffled by today’s college culture. Among their laments: Students are too wrapped up in racial and identity politics. They are allowed to take too many frivolous courses. They have repudiated the heroes and traditions of the past by judging them by today’s standards rather than in the context of their times. Fraternities are being unfairly maligned, and men are being demonized by sexual assault investigations. And university administrations have been too meek in addressing protesters whose messages have seemed to fly in the face of free speech. While the article focuses specifically on Amherst College, it also mentions Princeton, Yale, and Claremont McKenna— all schools that had protests that made the national news. How far has fundraising fallen? Hartocollis reports: Among about 35 small, selective liberal arts colleges belonging to the fund-raising organization Staff, or Sharing the Annual Fund Fundamentals, that recently reported their initial annual fund results for the 2016 fiscal year, 29 percent were behind 2015 in dollars, and 64 percent were behind in donors, according to a steering committee member, Scott Kleinheksel of Claremont McKenna College in California. Important to note are the limited avenues alumni have to truly make their voices heard. Letters to the editor of the alumni magazine and campus paper are but small opportunities in context of how much a monetary gift actually means to the school. Whether this is a temporary drop as a response to trending topics and issues or indicative of a larger, more permanent state of fundraising is yet to be seen. But as we get further away from the initial burst of protests last fall, other stakeholders are beginning to make their voices felt. Alumni in particular-whether they are now on the right or the left—generally endorse free speech and free inquiry quite strongly. They may play an increasingly strong role as we enter the second year of student protests.

3.No impact- 5 warrants

Rotherham 12 (Andrew J. Rotherham, “College Endowments: Why Even Harvard Isn’t as Rich as You Think” Feb. 09, 2012 <http://ideas.time.com/2012/02/09/college-endowments-why-even-harvard-isnt-as-rich-as-you-think/>

1. Most schools don’t have them. There are 2,719 four-year colleges in the U.S. (and another 1,690 two-year colleges), according to the most recent Department of Education figures. Most higher-education institutions have no endowment, says William Jarvis, managing director and head of research at the CommonFund Institute, which helps NACUBO with its endowment surveys. But as with everything else around higher education, it’s the elite schools — which tend to be the ones that have large endowments — that drive the conversation. Endowments just aren’t a big factor at most of the institutions of higher education in this country. 2. Many endowments are not that big. The endowments at schools like Harvard or Yale (No. 2, with $19.3 billion) or even public universities like the University of Texas (No. 3, at $17.1 billion) get the attention. But of the 823 U.S. colleges and universities that responded to a NACUBO survey (which also included Canadian schools), only 73 had endowments that topped $1 billion; 137 had less than $25 million. Of the U.S. schools in the NACUBO survey, the median endowment size is $90 million. Not too shabby, but at the standard expenditure rate, an endowment that size generates only about $4.5 million in spendable dollars per year. That’s a decent chunk of change, but hardly enough to eliminate student debt and rely on investment returns instead. Even Cooper Union, the famously no-tuition college in New York City (No. 126, at $607 million), is struggling financially, and indicated this past fall that it is considering charging tuition for the first time in a century. 3. The recession is still taking a toll. Endowments on average earned 19% returns on their investments in the last fiscal year, according to NACUBO. Who wouldn’t like earnings like that? But they lost about the same amount in 2009. Many schools have not fully rebounded from the downturn: 47% of endowments have less than they did in 2008, according to NACUBO. (MORE: Can GE Help Bring Common Core Standards to Life?) 4. Donors don’t always write blank checks. When your alma mater calls you and asks for a donation, it’s really hoping you’ll give to its general fund, where the use of your donation is unrestricted. Donations you give for scholarships or specific degrees, programs or activities can be used only for those purposes. It’s the same with large donations, and large donations frequently come with donor restrictions — for instance, a specifically endowed chair for a professor or a particular area of research. Sometimes a school can renegotiate with a donor to increase flexibility, such as using proceeds from an endowed chair for another purpose until a suitable hire can be found. Such revisions get complicated when the donors are no longer living. Bottom line: a lot of the money in those big endowments has claims on it, including at Harvard (where, by the way, I am a member of the visiting committee at the Graduate School of Education.) 5. Endowments are not all cash. Remember the various exotic investments that helped trigger the financial meltdown? Just like other big-time investors, endowments were attracted to private-equity deals, real estate, hedge funds, commodities and the like. NACUBO estimates that 54% of endowments are tied up in these alternative and illiquid investments. This style of endowment investing was pioneered by Yale’s David Swenson and subsequently became known as the “Harvard-Yale” model. A few years ago, when the downturn began, the endowments of those two schools — and all the others that had followed their example — got hammered. Back then, everyone wanted to be like Harvard and Yale — and they got their wish. When Ken Redd, NACUBO’s director of research and policy analysis, asked endowment leaders what they’re most worried about, they said another fiscal crisis that could trigger a shortage of cash. In that way, endowments are just like many Americans: overextended, with big dreams and not enough cash on hand.

## AT Title IX DA

1. aff only defends speech that criticizes the military- not hate speech. Even if we grant you a link it is comparatively tiny.
2. Empirically denied- free speech schools like Uchicago or public colleges still get Title IX protections easily. s

## AT Heg Good Short DA

1. Link turn- the aff keeps the military in check ensuring they don’t make poor decisions that decrease US heg, that’s slaughter 88. Iraq and Afghanistan proves, poor decisions make our military look bad, killing heg.
2. No link- they haven’t drawn a link from criticizing the military to decreasing heg- that’s a huge missing warrant that’s not in the case or the NC.
3. Case o/w militarism justifies violence including the violence that heg aims to solve- I control root cause.
4. Nu imapct- Cross apply bremer, Trump and squo political trends make heg useless, o/w it is more recent.

# Frontlines- CP

## AT Advantage CP’s General

1. Perm do both – at worst we garner double solvency, the solvency differential between the perm and the cp is the aff, so your decision should still be aff vs. DA.

## AT Courts Agent PIC

1. perm do both- CP creates the legal requirement- passing the plan is just being consistent with the requirement. Net benefit is the aff and the school doesn’t get sued for breaking the law.
2. Turn- sets precedent of allowing government to interfere with college speech codes, which makes the harms of the 1ac inev, 1ac ev proves government will abuse that right but can’t in squo because colleges have discretion.

## AT Ban the Military

1. No solvency- Congress repealing the miliatrsm doesn’t shift the cultural militarism that created it in the first place. If people aren’t allowed to dissent then the only discourse will be pro-military discourse that is angry that the act got repealed. Dissent is needed to shift the culture.

2. Just solves military policy but not other problems the military has like post 9/11 acts or things in the past.

3. Perm: do both. – at worst we garner double solvency, the solvency differential between the perm and the cp is the aff, so your decision should still be aff vs. DA.

4. Misses the point of 1AC solvency- aff solves people from being fired because of dissent, representing the take over of the university. Only the aff solves this, people can still be fired in the neg world.

5. alt agent doesn’t deny

## AT Agent CPs General

1. CP doesn’t deny the 1ac offense- what public colleges ought to do is evaluated against the backdrop of what actors are likely to do, not what they ought to do. For example, whether the US should give up nukes is mostly a question of whether other states would give up theirs as well, and not simply of whether a world in which all states behaved as they ought would involve the US giving up its stockpile.

2. Multiple actors can have the same obligation, so proving that the alt actor should take an act doesn’t disprove that the aff should also happen.

## AT PATRIOT Act CP

1. Doesn’t solve the aff- Patriot ACT just allows surveillance of teachers but it doesn’t have the power to literally stop them from speaking. Empirically proven by 1AC solvency, the government isn’t the ones silencing people, universities are.

2. PATRIOT act only covers post 9/11 policy not general military policy

3. Perm: do both.

4. No solvency- Congress repealing the PATRIOT act doesn’t shift the cultural militarism that created it in the first place. If people aren’t allowed to dissent then the only discourse will be pro-military discourse that is angry that the act got repealed. Dissent is needed to shift the culture.

5. Misses the point of 1AC solvency- aff solves people from being fired because of dissent, representing the take over of the university. Only the aff solves this, people can still be fired in the neg world.

# Frontlines-K

## A2 Roleplaying Bad

### O/v

* 1. I’m not pretending that I am the state, I am merely forming an opinion about what the state should do. For example, I can say that criminal ought not murder people without thinking that I am that criminal. Avoids the link and non-unique your offense, everyone forms opinions about the government.
  2. Non-unique the AC has an intellectual stance that militarism is bad and uses a policy to resolve it. Coopts both of our framework arguments.

### A2 Fiat is illusory

The alternative is similarly illusory - it doesn’t get implemented after this round. The 1ac says the you should focus on politics because that orients the discussion towards material oppression which is educational.

### A2 Antonio 95/Agency

This card is about actors. I’m not acting as the government cross apply the overview

### A2 Reid Brinkely/Psychological Violence

1. No link- I am not forcing anyone to roleplay. This isn’t a T arg, I just choose to roleplay, no one else has to.

2. Turn- the USFG’s racist history means roleplaying with its power is uniquely liberatory. It takes something oppressive and shows how oppressed debaters can use it to improve social conditions.

### A2 Need Good Starting Point

1. No impact- The only reason why intellectual stances matter is when they affect policies, but K has no policy stance to affect the material world. They will always use this excuse to stay theoretical.

2. Empirical solvency out of the 1AC denies this takeout and outweighs on probability.

## Truth Testing File

Never really read TT, just wrote this for fun.

### Extension

### AT Koh and Niemi

### AT Redefine better debater

### AT shmagency

### AT Debate is different because you can argue for new rules

### AT Tournament directors don’t enforce TT

### AT judge paradigms/judge deferral

### AT Racist Topics

### AT Allows you to be extremely racist in round

### AT Kritiks are Good

## EM

1. Use epistemic modesty to evaluate the framing debate. It forces engagement and ensures that the neg doesn’t moot the 6 minutes of the AC every round.

Overing 15 [Bob Overing, coach for Loyola in Los Angeles and debater for the USC Trojan Debate Squad, “Recovering the Role of the Ballot: Evaluative Modesty in Academic Debate,” Paper presented at the 2015 Alta Argumentation Conference, July 31, 2015]

What I have been calling “modesty” with regard to ROBs is an application of a theory gaining interest among normative ethicists. One “confident” way to go about deciding how one ought to act is to determine what moral system is best and then act on its precepts. A “modest” way is to consider all the relevant moral systems, one’s credence in each of them, and the magnitude of the possible outcomes according to those theories. Philosophers Jacob Ross (2006) and Andrew Sepielli (2010) have defended something like the modest view, but I will not rehash their work here. Overall, they have found that when one is uncertain, the best principles of rational decision-making and our basic intuitions tell us to consider more than one moral theory. Likewise, I ask that debaters and judges consider debating with more than just one narrow ROB. The first major advantage to modesty is that it balances the benefits of policy-based education and critical education derived from continental philosophy, critical race theory, rhetoric, etc. Proponents of both types of education make persuasive arguments for theories and practices that meet their ends (E.g. Strait & Wallace, 2008; Varda & Cook, 2012). Modesty maintains the advantages of both by forcing teams to engage on the assumption that both ROBs matter to the judge’s decision calculus. This prevents teams from talking past each other, which is surprisingly common. For instance, on this year’s college topic, an affirmative could defend legalization of marijuana by presenting the history of violent and racist drug criminalization but simultaneously argue that a disadvantage to legalization based on cartel violence is not germane to their role of the ballot. Or, a policy-based affirmative could argue that the epistemic problems in its representations of the international arena and its call for greater U.S. securitization are irrelevant to whether the plan is a good idea. Both examples of “framing” the debate are a means of hastily excluding discussion, and both are dominant strategies precisely because they enable the complete exclusion of the opposing team’s offense. Ryan Galloway (2007) extols the values of debate as a dialogical conversation, but nothing hampers dialogue more than a confident view of ROBs that allows teams to assert to their opponents, “You must only do X.” I believe that modesty excels at meeting Galloway’s vision for dialogue: Such an approach would have little use for rigid rules of logic or argument, such as stock issues…except to the point where the participants agreed that these were functional approaches. Instead, a dialogic approach encourages evaluations of affirmative cases relative to their performative benefits (p. 3). Indeed, modesty does away with rigid rules for the content of ROBs, embracing what Harrigan (2007) calls “argumentative pluralism” (p. 51-52). While Galloway and Harrigan use these values to motivate defenses of “the resolution as the bright line standard for evaluation” and switch-side debate, respectively, I find modesty a much better compromise. A modest judge can give weight to the effects of a plan while still considering “pre-fiat” problems of representation, ideology, epistemology, and the like. Rather than attempting to fit one set of arguments into another’s toolbox, modesty allows teams to do what they do best without excluding the opposition wholesale. One objection at this point may be that the modest strategy decreases clash or stasis around a single topic. Without narrowing debates through a filter such as the resolution or even a broad “three-tier process” (See Bankey, 2013, p. 44; Reid-Brinkley, 2008, p. 84), modesty allows any ROB. However, on modesty, there is a larger strategic incentive to engage because the opposition’s route to the ballot will always be relevant, never merely excluded or precluded. A final advantage of modesty is to return ROBs to the realm of normal argument evaluation. Confidence imbues the ROB with a special reverence that is unpredictable and unfair to the competitors. When weighing warming vs. economic collapse, judges do not first decide which impact to grant priority and second which team has the best links to that impact. Judges consider the strength of link to those impacts, so even if one impact is worse, its likelihood as a result of the plan is also relevant. The same goes for any other aspect of debate, and seeing the ROB as analogous to these instances of impact framing may make modesty much more intuitively appealing.

2. Extend the Mills 05 evidence. Real world oppression cannot be essentialized by any one theory which will inevitably fail to account for how different structures create material conditions. This warrants modesty.

## AT Affropess

### Omit

## AT Black Nihilsim

### Omit

## AT Generic Pessimism

### Omit

## AT Queer pess K

### Omit

## AT Cap

#### We also read Impact turns to cap pretty often, but these are the topical answers

1. No root cause- military power and violence existed long before cap was invented and is based in a desire for power not money

2. Perm do the aff and alt in all other instances

A. Case is a net benefit- key to accessing alt solvency. The aff is makes students into activists, which gives students the skills to do the alternative without being silenced by the university. Also solves material violence for that prevents people them from fighting capitalism because they are dying in the streets.

B. If the alt is strong enough to resolve all instances in the squo then it should be strong enough to resolve the link of the 1ac.

3. Case is a link turn- their evidence is about free speech generally, but the aff specific ev is about protesting capitalist militants who have wars and inflict violence just to gain power and money. Outweighs on specificity.

4. Link is tiny- case outweighs

1. it’s just about how the plan operates underneath a capitalist module of speech, but I still resist it’s logic.
2. it’s effected by every other instance of speech that the plan doesn’t defend.
3. it’s effected by the 200 other countries in the world that promote cap.

5. Cap inevitable - evolution means we are all selfish

Thayer 2k Bradley A., Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense & Strategic Study, Missouri State University, International Security, 01622889, Fall2000, Vol. 25, Issue 2 “"Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics"

Evolutionary theory offers two sufficient explanations for the trait of egoism. The first is a classic Darwinian argument: In a hostile environment where resources are scarce and thus survival precarious, organisms typically satisfy their own physiological needs for food, shelter, and so on before assisting others.[41] In times of danger or great stress, an organism usually places its life its survival--before that of other members of its group, be it pack, herd, or tribe. For these reasons, egoistic behavior contributes to fitness. Evolutionary theorist Richard Dawkins's selfish gene theory provides the second sufficient explanation for egoism. A conceptual shift is required here because Dawkins's level of analysis is the gene, not the organism. As Dawkins explains, at one time there were no organisms, just chemicals in a primordial "soup."[42] At first, different types of molecules started forming by accident, including some that could reproduce by using the constituents of the soup--carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen. Because these constituents were in limited supply, molecules competed for them as they replicated. From this competition, the most efficient copy makers emerged. The process, however, was never perfect. Sometimes mistakes were made during replication, and occasionally these accidents resulted in more efficient replication or made some other contribution to fitness. One such mistake might have been the formation of a thin membrane that held the contents of the molecule together--a primitive cell. A second might have involved the division of the primitive cell into ever larger components, organs, and so on to create what Dawkins calls "survival machines." He explains, "The first survival machines probably consisted of nothing more than a protective coat. But making a living got steadily harder as new rivals arose with better and more effective survival machines. Survival machines got bigger and more elaborate, and the process was cumulative and progressive."[43] From a genetic perspective, there is no intentionality in this process, but it continued nonetheless because of evolution. Dawkins makes clear, however, that the interests of the gene and the organism need not coincide at different stages in an organism's life, particularly after reproduction.[44] In general, however, the selfishness of the gene increases its fitness, and so the behavior spreads.

6. Perm: Do the aff as a display of the kritik. Net benefit is viewing progress from a parallax view—supercharges alt solvency.

Zizek 03, Slavoj, Liberation Hurts: An Interview with Slavoj Žižek”, <http://www.electronicbookreview.com/thread/endconstruction/desublimation>, 03

I'm trying to avoid two extremes. One extreme is the traditional pseudo-radical position which says, "If you engage in politics - helping trade unions or combating sexual harassment, whatever - you've been co-opted" and so on. Then you have the other extreme which says, "Ok, you have to do something." I think both are wrong. I hate those pseudo radicals who dismiss every concrete action by saying, "This will all be co-opted." Of course, everything can be co-opted [chuckles] but this is just a nice excuse to do absolutely nothing. Of course, there is a danger that "the long march through institutions" - to use the old Maoist term, popular in European student movements thirty-some years ago - will last so long that you'll end up part of the institution. We need more than ever, a parallax view - a double perspective. You engage in acts, being aware of their limitations. This does not mean that you act with your fingers crossed. No, you fully engage, but with the awareness - the ultimate wager in the almost Pascalian sense - that is not simply that this act will succeed, but that the very failure of this act will trigger a much more radical process.

## AT Secrecy K

1. Perm vote aff to endorse the negative- it makes your alliances to the neg strategy hidden.

2. Perm do both- certain people can have underground strategies but academics will have open strategies

* 1. AC is a net benefit
  2. Better hides the underground people- no one will be suspicion where all the protests went
  3. no one is going to freely engage in the alt. They need to see this is a group project in order to grow the movement- only open procedures can do this.

1. Empirical case solvency from Chile deny the thesis of the K
2. Turn- Colleges are more secret than alternative methods- they are in academic classrooms that no one is hearing about or conversation. Other methods like protests in the street are way more unsecretivie.
3. Turn- this makes literally 0 sense in the context of the aff- we need to openly challenge militarism in order to shift our culture. Keeping it secret just continues the story of militarism being good and valuable.

## AT Heg Good K

1. Link turn- the aff keeps the military in check ensuring they don’t make poor decisions that decrease US heg. Iraq and Afghanistan proves, poor decisions make our military look bad, killing heg. That’s slaughter 88
2. No link- the aff doesn’t say heg bad, it just says militarism bad. Aff solvency comes from teaching students that violence and the military shouldn’t be glorified, not from destroying the military.
3. Perm-do the aff and the alt in all other instances.

A. If the alt is strong enough to resolve all instances in the squo then it should be strong enough to resolve the link of the 1ac.

B. Net benefit is the 1ac- stops a culture of violence that creats thing like gun violence.

#### 3. Expanding U.S. Heg triggers resentment, which links turns their offense. Heg is unsustainable.

Maher 11 – Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department at Brown University

(Richard, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, world politics has been unipolar, defined by American preponderance in each of the core components of state power—military, economic, and technological. Such an imbalanced distribution of power in favor of a single country is unprecedented in the modern state system. This material advantage does not automatically translate into America’s preferred political and diplomatic outcomes, however. Other states, if now only at the margins, are challenging U.S. power and authority. Additionally, on a range of issues, the United States is finding it increasingly difficult to realize its goals and ambitions. The even bigger challenge for policymakers in Washington is how to respond to signs that America’s unquestioned preeminence in international politics is waning. This decline in the United States’ relative position is in part a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the U.S. position both internationally and domestically may actually be strengthened once this period of unipolarity has passed. On pure material terms, the gap between the United States and the rest of the world is indeed vast. The U.S. economy, with a GDP of over $14 trillion, is nearly three times the size of China’s, now the world’s second-largest national economy. The United States today accounts for approximately 25 percent of global economic output, a figure that has held relatively stable despite steadily increasing economic growth in China, India, Brazil, and other countries. Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent. When one takes discretionary spending into account, the United States today spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. This imbalance is even further magnified by the fact that five of the next seven biggest spenders are close U.S. allies. China, the country often seen as America’s next great geopolitical rival, has a defense budget that is one-seventh of what the United States spends on its military. There is also a vast gap in terms of the reach and sophistication of advanced weapons systems. By some measures, the United States spends more on research and development for its military than the rest of the world combined. What is remarkable is that the United States can do all of this without completely breaking the bank. The United States today devotes approximately 4 percent of GDP to defense. As a percentage of GDP, the United States today spends far less on its military than it did during the Cold War, when defense spending hovered around 10 percent of gross economic output. As one would expect, the United States today enjoys unquestioned preeminence in the military realm. No other state comes close to having the capability to project military power like the United States.1 And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America’s growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America’s closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil’s growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America’s vast power is not translating into America’s preferred outcomes. As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one’s preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one’s predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one’s friends just as much as in one’s [and] rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily American predominance that produces unease but rather American predominance. Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries’ own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country’s economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America’s own interests. Predominant power likewise [and] breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one’s role and purpose is acceptable and one’s power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics. As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America’s position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the ‘‘post-unipolar’’ world.

#### 4. Hegemony isn’t key to peace, stats prove

Fettweis 11 – Department of Political Science, Tulane University,

(Christopher J. Fettweis, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO)

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

### Hegemony Unsustainable Topshelf

#### Hegemony is unsustainable

Layne 12 – Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley

(Christopher, 2012, "The Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, Ebsco, p. 2, KONTOPOULOS)

Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, it now is evident that both the 1980s declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right after all. The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of US decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history. However, it is fair to say the Great Recession has both accelerated the causal forces driving these trends and magniﬁed their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external driver of US decline is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia. In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the relative—and in some ways absolute—decline in America’s economic power, the looming ﬁscal crisis confronting the United States, and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status.

#### Hegemonic retrenchment’s key to avoid great power war---maintaining unipolarity’s self-defeating which internal link-turns their offense

Nuno P. Monteiro 12, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Winter 2012, Vol. 36, No. 3, p. 9-40

From the perspective of the overall peacefulness of the international system, then, no U.S. grand strategy is, as in the Goldilocks tale, “just right.”116 In fact, each strategic option available to the unipole produces significant conflict. Whereas offensive and defensive dominance will entangle it in wars against recalcitrant minor powers, disengagement will produce regional wars among minor and major powers. Regardless of U.S. strategy, conflict will abound. Indeed, if my argument is correct, the significant level of conflict the world has experienced over the last two decades will continue for as long as U.S. power remains preponderant. From the narrower perspective of the unipole’s ability to avoid being involved in wars, however, disengagement is the best strategy. A unipolar structure provides no incentives for conflict involving a disengaged unipole. Disengagement would extricate the unipole’s forces from wars against recalcitrant minor powers and decrease systemic pressures for nuclear proliferation. There is, however, a downside. Disengagement would lead to heightened conflict beyond the unipole’s region and increase regional pressures for nuclear proliferation. As regards the unipole’s grand strategy, then, the choice is between a strategy of dominance, which leads to involvement in numerous conflicts, and a strategy of disengagement, which allows conflict between others to fester. In a sense, then, strategies of defensive and offensive dominance are self-defeating. They create incentives for recalcitrant minor powers to bolster their capabilities and present the United States with a tough choice: allowing them to succeed or resorting to war in order to thwart them. This will either drag U.S. forces into numerous conflicts or result in an increasing number of major powers. In any case, U.S. ability to convert power into favorable outcomes peacefully will be constrained.117This last point highlights one of the crucial issues where Wohlforth and I differ—the benefits of the unipole’s power preponderance. Whereas Wohlforth believes that the power preponderance of the United States will lead all states in the system to bandwagon with the unipole, I predict that states engaged in security competition with the unipole’s allies and states for whom the status quo otherwise has lesser value will not accommodate the unipole. To the contrary, these minor powers will become recalcitrant despite U.S. power preponderance, displaying the limited pacifying effects of U.S. power. What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole? What can a unipole do that a great power in bipolarity or multipolarity cannot? My argument hints at the possibility that—at least in the security realm—unipolarity does not give the unipole greater influence over international outcomes.118 If unipolarity provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification.”119 For Jervis, “[t]his raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. . . . In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important.”120¶ At the same time, nothing in my argument determines the decline of U.S. power. The level of conflict entailed by the strategies of defensive dominance, offensive dominance, and disengagement may be acceptable to the unipole and have only a marginal effect on its ability to maintain its preeminent position. Whether a unipole will be economically or militarily overstretched is an empirical question that depends on the magnitude of the disparity in power between it and major powers and the magnitude of the conflicts in which it gets involved. Neither of these factors can be addressed a priori, and so a theory of unipolarity must acknowledge the possibility of frequent conflict in a nonetheless durable unipolar system.¶ Finally, my argument points to a “paradox of power preponderance.”121 By putting other states in extreme self-help, a systemic imbalance of power requires the unipole to act in ways that minimize the threat it poses. Only by exercising great restraint can it avoid being involved in wars. If the unipole fails to exercise restraint, other states will develop their capabilities, including nuclear weapons—restraining it all the same.122 Paradoxically, then, more relative power does not necessarily lead to greater influence and a better ability to convert capabilities into favorable outcomes peacefully. In effect, unparalleled relative power requires unequaled self-restraint.

### AT Deterrence

1. Empirically denied – even with US hegemony, states aren’t afraid and deterred. North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear weapons, wars have consistently occurred throughout the world, and other states are catching up
2. TURN: cross apply Maher. US hegemony invites backlash and resentment, allowing the US to become a scapegoat and a target for other countries
3. TURN: cross apply Monteiro. Hegemony draws the US into numerous conflicts – Iraq war empirically proves. Even if you win hegemony may deter other countries, US involvement will ensure escalation in conflicts that outweighs in scope – absent US involvement, wars cannot escalate internationally

**The risk only swings one way—if we’re disengaged, we can choose to enter the fight. Extended deterrence kills our strategic flexibility**

Layne 6 – Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley

[Christopher, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present, Cornell University Press (Ithica), p. 163]

Although rare, great power wars do happen. Indeed, there are many reasons to believe another Eurasian great power war might break out in the next several decades. The United States does have a choice grand strategically. It can maintain its Eurasian military commitments in the hope of preventing such a war, or it can pull back its forward presence from Eurasia and rely on a multipolar regional power balance to block the emergence of a hegemon. If the United States sticks with its current grand strategy and fails to stop the outbreak of great power war in Eurasia, it will be automatically swept up in the fighting—regardless either of its degree of interest in the conflict or the costs and risks of involvement. As an offshore balancer, on the other hand, the United States would have the ability to intervene in a war if its security interests necessitated that it do so, but it might also be able to stay out of a war altogether if they didn’t.

## AT Deluze/Recognition K

### Omit

## AT Habeas Viscus

### Omit

# Frontlines- NC

## AT Kant NC

### FW Overview

### AT universalization

Omit

### AT agency is constitutive

Omit

### Case

1. Omit

2. Speech can never be a wrong because it doesn’t violate others freedom to do as they please- that’s offense for me. If speech isn’t a wrong, then censorship is unjustified.

Varden 10 summarizes, Helga Varden (Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois) “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech” May 22nd 2010 Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World Volume 3 of the series AMINTAPHIL: The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice pp 39-55 <http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-90-481-8999-1_4>

2 Virtuous Versus Rightful Private Speech In order to understand Kant’s conception of free speech we need a good grasp of his conception of rightful relations in general. With this conception in hand, we can see how Kant conceives of rightful private speech. Then we can see how rightful private speech is distinguished from rightful public speech, namely that which is protected or outlawed by various public law measures, including free speech legislation. Right, for Kant, is solely concerned with people’s actions in space and time, or what he calls our “external use of choice” (6: 213f, 224ff). When we deem each other and ourselves capable of deeds, meaning that we see each other and ourselves as the authors of our actions, we “impute” these actions to each other and to ourselves. Such imputation, Kant argues, shows that we judge ourselves and each other as capable of freedom under laws with regard to external use of choice – or ‘external freedom’ (6: 227). Moreover, when we interact, we need to enable reciprocal external freedom, meaning that we must find a way of interacting that is consistent with everybody’s external freedom. And this is where justice, or what Kant calls ‘right’ comes in. Right is the relation between interacting persons’ external freedom such that reciprocal external freedom is realized (6: 230). This is what Kant means when he says that rightful interactions are interactions reconcilable with each person’s innate right to freedom, namely the right to “independence from being constrained by another’s choices... insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (6: 237). For Kant, right requires that universal laws of freedom, rather than anyone’s arbitrary choices, reciprocally regulate interacting individuals’ external freedom. The first upshot of this conception of right is that anything that concerns morality as such is beyond its proper grasp. Right concerns only external freedom, which is limited to what can be hindered in space and time (coerced), whereas morality also requires internal freedom. That is to say, morality encompasses both right and virtue, and virtue requires what Kant calls freedom with regard to “internal use of choice”. Internal freedom requires a person both to act on universalizable maxims and to do so from the motivation of duty (6: 220f) – and neither can be coercively enforced. This is why Kant argues that only freedom with regard to interacting persons’ external use of choice (right) can be coercively enforced; freedom with regard to both internal (virtue) and external use of choice – morality – cannot be coercively enforced (ibid.). Because morality requires freedom with regard to both internal and external use of choice, it cannot be enforced. This distinction between internal and external use of choice and freedom explains why Kant maintains that most ways in which a person uses words in his interactions with others cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right: “such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promising them something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue and insincere” do not constitute wrongdoing because “it is entirely up to them [the listeners] whether they want to believe him or not” (6: 238). The utterance of words in space and time does not have the power to hinder anyone else’s external freedom, including depriving him of his means. Since words as such cannot exert physical power over people, it is impossible to use them as a means of coercion against another. For example, if you block my way, you coerce me by hindering my movements: you hinder my external freedom. If, however, you simply tell me not to move, you have done nothing coercive, nothing to hinder my external freedom, as I can simply walk passed you. So, even though by means of your words, you attempt to influence my internal use of choice by providing me with possible reasons for acting, you accomplish nothing coercive. That is, you may wish that I take on your proposal for action, but you do nothing to force me to do so. Whether or not I choose to act on your suggestion is still entirely up to me. Therefore, you cannot choose for me. My choice to act on your words is beyond the reach of your words, as is any other means I might have. Indeed, even if what you suggest is the virtuous thing to do, your words are powerless with regard to making me act virtuously. Virtuous action requires not only that I act on the right maxims, but that I also do so because it is the right thing to do, or from duty. Because the choice of maxims (internal use of choice) and duty (internal freedom) are beyond the grasp of coercion, Kant holds that most uses of words, including immoral ones such as lying, cannot be seen as involving wrongdoing from the point of view of right.

### AT Consent

1. Morally repugnant- this would justify the Nazi’s killing jews who consented by staying in Germany. The real question is obviously is if the action is right or wrong, not if the students choose to go there.

2. Some students don’t know that restrictions are being passed or are already attending the college before the restrictions are passed.

### AT Seditious Speech

1. Size of link goes aff- the aff stops thousands of kant violations for when people censor because they are annoying the administration or ideological differences, they only stop a single one.

2. No unqiuness- they don’t have any proof that any college restricts seditious speech in the squo.

3. Not an infinite violation- things can’t be more or less contradictory, which is the justification for the framework. Comparatively more justifications are not are worse under Kant.

4. Seditious Speech is justified in an unjust world, states only have unique rights to exist because they protect everyone. 1AC evidence proves that the state is not following through with this goal, empirically proven by racism in the status quo. Thus seditious speech is not a violation.

## AT Hobbes

### FW

### Omit

### Turns

1. Turn- under Hobbes we should follow what the constitution says because that is the ultimate authority of the government. That affirms because the aff defends constitutionally protected speech. This outweighs

a. magnitude- the government is a much more powerful sovereign that public colleges, because it actually resolves the state of nature and can make laws.

b. Specificity- their offense assumes an ideal world where the sovereign always makes the right choices. But my turns are about what the sovereign actually says, rather than what they wish the sovereign would say.

## AT Particularism NC

### Framework Overview

1. Omit

### Turns

1. Turn- the aff gives professors and students to socially monitor speech in every specific circumstance, while the neg has universal speech codes that apply to every instance.

This turn outweighs

1. only my turn is comparative with the alternative situation, which means it better articulates which side overall is more particular
2. NU’s all their offense- social shunning solves particular circumstances

2. The aff is a plan that defends a specific type of speech- if that isn’t particular I don’t know what is. Double bind- either nothing is specific enough so the fw can’t guide action or the aff is specific enough.

# Frontlines- T/Theory Counter-Interps

## AT T Any Long

### Omit

## AT Solvency Advncate Theory

### Omit

## AT New Affs Bad

#### Omit

## AT Spikes Must be Bidirectional

### Omit

## AT ROTB Spec

Counter- Interp: I’ll defend the converse of their interp.

1. This shell is completely wrong- these are all substantive issues that we should has out as arguments NOT as things I need to clarify. They aren’t advocacy questions which means they are all challengeable. Couple impacts

a. solves all their offense- they can just make arguments if any of these become relevant. That means it’s resolvable.

b. Clash- means we actually debate on these issues, rather than the aff being able to assert something as true. Key to education because we are challenging each other’s positions and key to fairness to ensure I can’t just assert tings that only help me.

2. infinite regress- there is always more I could spec

a. proves the interp is an arbitrarily brightline. Cross apply their reasonability bad justifications.

b. means it is impossible for me to meet the interp, because there is always another spec shell. That’s a prima facie reason to reject the interp, otherwise I would always lose.

## AT ‘Which Aff’ Good

I thought this norm was silly at first, but just decided to go along with it. I’m still undecided on it.

## TJFs good

### Omit

# 1AR Theory

### Omit

# Different 1AC Versions

## Versus FW Debaters

## Part 1 is Framing

Ethics is divided between ideal and non-ideal theory. Ideal theory ask what justice demands in a perfect world while non-ideal theory ask what justice demands in a world that is already unjust. Prefer non-ideal theory as a starting point:

1. Ideal theory fails to guide action in this unjust world

MILLS 05: Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005

Now how can this ideal ideal—a society not merely without a past history of racism but without races themselves—serve to adjudicate the merits of competing policies aimed at correcting for a long history of white supremacy manifest in Native American expropriation, African slavery, residential and educational segregation, large differentials in income and huge differentials in wealth, nonwhite underrepresentation in high-prestige occupations and overrepresentation in the prison system, contested national narratives and cultural representations, widespread white evasion and bad faith on issues of their racial privilege, and a corresponding hostile white backlash against (what remains of) those mild corrective measures already implemented? Obviously, it cannot. As Thomas Nagel concedes: “Ideal theory enables you to say when a society is unjust, because it falls short of the ideal. But it does not tell you what to do if, as is almost always the case, you find yourself in an unjust society, and want to correct that injustice” (2003a, 82). Ideal theory represents an unattainable target that would require us to roll back the clock and start over. So in a sense it is an ideal with little or no practical worth. What is required is the nonideal (rectificatory) ideal that starts from the reality of these injustices and then seeks some fair means of correcting for them, recognizing that in most cases the original prediscrimination situation (even if it can be intelligibly characterized and stipulated) cannot be restored. Trying to rectify systemic black disadvantage through affirmative action is not the equivalent of not discriminating against blacks, especially when there are no blacks to be discriminated against. Far from being indispensable to the elaboration of nonideal theory, ideal theory would have been revealed to be largely useless for it. But the situation is worse than that. As the example just given illustrates, it is not merely a matter of an ideal with problems of operationalization and relevance, but of an ideal likely to lend itself more readily to retrograde political agendas. If the ideal ideal rather than the rectificatory ideal is to guide us, then a world without races and any kind of distinctiondrawing by race may seem to be an attractive goal. One takes the ideal to be colorblind nondiscrimination, as appropriate for a society beginning from the state of nature, and then—completely ignoring the nonideal history that has given whites a systemic illicit advantage over people of color—conflates together as “discrimination” all attempts to draw racial distinctions for public policy goals, no matter what their motivation, on the grounds that this perpetuates race and invidious differential treatment by race. In the magisterial judgment of Chief Justice John Roberts in the June 2007 Supreme Court decision on the Seattle and Louisville cases where schools were using race as a factor to maintain diversity, “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,”6 a statement achieving the remarkable feat of depicting not merely as true, but as tautologically true, the equating of Jim Crow segregation and the attempt to remedy Jim Crow tion! What is ideally called for under ideal circumstances is not, or at least is not necessarily, what is ideally called for under nonideal circumstances. Claiming that all we need to do is to cease (what is here characterized as) discrimination ignores the differential advantages and privileges that have accumulated in the white population because of the past history of discrimination. So the defense in terms of ideal theory is doubly problematic. In the first place, ideal theory was never supposed to be an end in itself, but a means to improving our handling of nonideal matters, and the fact that Rawls and his disciples and commentators have for the most part stayed in the realm of the ideal represents an evasion of the imperative of dealing with what were supposed to be the really pressing issues. And in the second place, it is questionable in any case how useful the ideal ideal in the Rawlsian sense is or ever would have been in assisting this task. So it is not merely that ideal theory has not come to the aid of those dealing with nonideal injustice but that it was unlikely to have been of much help when and if it ever did arrive.

2. Ideal theory strips away questions of particularities and isolates a universal feature of agents. This normalizes a single experience and epistemologically skews ethical theorizing.

Mills 05, Charles, 2005, Ideal Theory” as Ideology,

The crucial common claim—whether couched in terms of ideology and fetishism, or androcentrism, or white normativity—is that all theorizing, both moral and nonmoral, takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, norms, values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experience and group interests of the privileged group (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that “spontaneously” occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often be the case that dominant concepts will obscure certain crucial realities, blocking them from sight, or naturalizing them, while on the other hand, concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. This is, of course, the burden of standpoint theory—that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged (Harding 2003). The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group. In its ignoring of oppression, ideal theory also ignores the consequences of oppression. If societies are not oppressive, or if in modeling them we can abstract away from oppression and assume moral cognizers of roughly equal skill, then the paradigmatic moral agent can be featureless. No theory is required about the particular group-based obstacles that may block the vision of a particular group. By contrast, nonideal theory recognizes that people will typically be cognitively affected by their social location, so that on both the macro and the more local level, the descriptive concepts arrived at may be misleading.

Non-ideal theory necessitates consequentialism since instead of following rules that assume an already equal playing field; we take steps to correct material injustice.

Thus the role of the ballot is vote for the advocacy that best minimizes oppression.

Prefer

1. Anything else is just intellectual gymnastics to avoid talking about oppression, excluding oppressed debaters.

Smith 13, Elijah “A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate.” Vbriefly. September 6, 2013

At every tournament you attend this year look around the cafeteria and take note of which students are not sitting amongst you and your peers. Despite being some of the best and the brightest in the nation, many students are alienated from and choose to not participate in an activity I like to think of as homeplace. In addition to the heavy financial burden associated with national competition, the exclusionary atmosphere of a debate tournament discourages black students from participating. Widespread awareness of the same lack of participation in policy debate has led to a growing movement towards alternative styles and methods of engaging the gatekeepers of the policy community, (Reid-Brinkley 08) while little work has been done to address or even acknowledge the same concern in Lincoln Douglas debate. Unfortunately students of color are not only forced to cope with a reality of structural violence outside of debate, but within an activity they may have joined to escape it in the first place. We are facing more than a simple trend towards marginalization occurring in Lincoln Douglas, but a culture of exclusion that locks minority participants out of the ranks of competition. It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of racism in debate is constituted by the singular choices that institutions, coaches, and students make on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to abstractions to distance the conversation from the material reality that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. Community norms would have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules to accuse black debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations but as someone who understands that experience, the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential. Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape.

2. Means based theories collapses into consequentialism in order to explain necessary enablers.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Sinnott- Armstrong, Walter. “An Argument For Consequentialism” Dartmouth College. Philosophical Perspectives, 6, Ethics, 1992.]

The simplest deontological theory is the pluralistic intuitionism of Prichard and Ross. Ross writes that when someone promises to do something. ‘This we consider obligatory in its own nature just because it is a fulfillment of a promise and not because of its consequences."2 Such deontologists claim in effect that if I promise to mow the grass, there is a moral reason for me to mow the grass and this moral reason is constituted by the fact that mowing the grass fulfills my promise. This reason exists regardless of the consequences of mowing the grass even though it might be overridden by certain bad consequences. However if this is why I have a moral reason to mow the grass then even if I cannot mow the grass without starting my mower and starting the mower would enable me to mow the grass it still would not follow that l have any moral reason to start my mower since I did not promise to start my mower and starting my mower does not fulfill my promise. Thus a moral theory cannot explain moral substitutability ii it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons. Of course this argument is too simple to be conclusive by itself since deontologists will have many responses. The question is whether any response is adequate. I will argue that no response can meet the basic challenge. A deontologist might respond that his moral theory includes not only the principle that there is a moral reason to keep one's promises but also another principle that there is a moral reason to do whatever is a necessary enabler for what there is a moral reason to do. This other principle just is the principle of moral substitutability. So of course. I agree that it is true. However, the question is why it is true. This new principle is very different from the substantive principles in a deontological theory. So it cries out for an explanation. ii a deontologist simply adds this new principle to the substantive principles in his theory. he has done nothing to explain why the new principle is true. It would be ad hoc to tack it on solely in order to yield moral reasons like the moral reason to start the mower. in order to explain or justify moral substitutability. A deontologist needs to show how this principle coheres in some deeper way with the substantive principles of the theory. That is what deontologists cannot do. A second response is that l misdescribed the property that provides the moral reason. Deontologists might admit that the reason to mow the lawn is not that this fulfills a promise. but they can claim instead that the moral reason to mow the lawn is that this is a necessary enabler for keeping a promise. They can then claim that there is a moral reason to start the mower. because starting the mower is also a necessary enabler for keeping my promise. Again. I agree that these reasons exist. But the question is why. This deontologist needs to explain why the moral reason has to be that the act is a necessary enabler for fulfilling a promise instead of just that the act does fulfill a promise. Ii there is no moral reason to keep a promise. it is hard to understand why there is any moral reason to do what is a necessary enabler for keeping a promise. Furthermore, deontologists claim that the crucial act is not about consequences but directly about promises. My moral reason is supposed to arise from what I said before my act and not from consequences alter my act. However, what I said was “I promise to mow the grass'. I did not say. ‘l promise to do what is a necessary enabler for mowing the grass.’ Thus I did not promise to do what is a necessary enabler for keeping the promise. What I promised was only to keep the promise. Because of this deontologists who base moral reasons directly on promises cannot explain why there is not only a moral reason to do what I promised to do (mow the grass) but also a moral reason to do what i did not promise to do (start the mower). Deontologists might try to defend the claim that moral reasons are based on promises by claiming that promise keeping is intrinsically good and there is a moral reason to do what is a necessary enabler of what is intrinsically good. However, this response runs into two problems. First, on this theory, the reason to keep a promise is a reason to do what is itself intrinsically good, but the reason to start the mower is not a reason to do what is intrinsically good. Since these reasons are so different, they are derived in different ways. This creates an incoherence or lack of unity, which is avoided in other theories. Second, this response conflicts with a basic theme in deontological theories. If my promise keeping is intrinsically good, your promise keeping is just as intrinsically good. But then, if what gives me a moral reason to keep my promise is that I have a moral reason to do whatever is intrinsically good, I have just as much moral reason to do what is a necessary enabler for you to keep your promise. And, if my breaking my promise is a necessary enabler for two other people to keep their promises, then my moral reason to break my promise is stronger than my moral reason to keep it (other things being equal). This undermines the basic deontological claim that my reasons derive in a special way from my promises.13 So this response explains moral sub- stitutability at the expense of giving up deontology.

3. Moral theorizing starts with material violence. No one would ever complain or even think up a moral system unless they didn’t like the current situation, which by definition means they must have material harms inflicted upon them or they wouldn’t care enough to start thinking WHY it is bad that this is occurring.

## Part 2 is Advocacy

Plan text, Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict constitutionally protected speech that is used to criticize the military’s policies.

## Part 3 is Offense

Patriotic Correctness on campuses runs rampant- dissent is charged with treason and lines of critical thought are silenced. Higher education has been coopted by the military industrial complex, reducing the roles of teachers to mere technicians. Members of college campuses are routinely fired if they criticize the military, causing a chilling effect on such discussion. Multiple empirical examples prove:

Wilson 15, John K., Ph.D candidate with dissertation on the history of academic freedom in America and author of three books, “Patriotic Correctness: Academic Freedom and Its Enemies,” Routledge, Nov 30, 2015

Compared to earlier “wartime” situations, academic freedom is far more protected today than at any time in the past. But the danger posed to academic freedom cannot be ignored. Efforts to silence faculty and students, even when they are unsuccessful, can make others around the country more reluctant to speak openly. Only by denouncing all efforts at censorship and vigorously defending the right of freedom on college campuses, can we continue to protect academic freedom. The cliché of our times, constantly repeated but often true, is that 9/11 “changed everything.” One thing that it changed was academic freedom. The controversy over the limits of free speech on college campuses across the nation began immediately. On the morning of September 11, 2001, University of New Mexico history professor Richard Berthold joked with his class, “Anyone who would blow up the Pentagon would have my vote.” Berthold received death threats, keeping him off campus. On September 27, an unidentified person left a message on the provost’s voice-mail saying if Berthold were not “ousted” within 24 hours, Berthold would be ousted by other sources. Berthold was threatened in front of his home by a biker who came at him screaming obscenities, and he received several angry e-mails and letters with messages such as “I’d like to blow you up.” New Mexico state representative William Fuller declared,“Treason is giving aide or comfort to the enemy. Any terrorist who heard Berthold’s comment was comforted.” In the end, Berthold was pressured to retire from his job because of those 11 words he spoke on 9/11.Mohammad Rahat, an Iranian citizen and University of Miami medical technician who turned 22 years old on September 11, 2001, declared in a meeting that day, “Some birthday gift from Osama bin Laden.” Although Rahat said that he meant it “in a sarcastic way,” Rahat was suspended and then fired on September 25, 2001. Paula Musto, vice president of university relations, declared that Rahat’s “comments were deeply disturbing to his co-workers and superiors at the medical school. They were inappropriate and unbecoming for someone working in a research laboratory. He was fired because he made those comments, certainly not because of his ethnic background.” Rahat had received only positive evaluation in 13 months working in the lab. 6 At the University of California at Los Angeles, library assistant Jonnie Hargis was suspended without pay for one week after sending an e-mail response criticizing American policies in Iraq and Israel. Hargis’ union successfully pursued a grievance; Hargis was repaid for his lost income, the incident was stricken from his job record, and the university was forced to clarify its e-mail policies.7On September 13, 2001, two resident assistants in Minnesota complained to the dean of students that undergraduates felt fearful and uneasy because some professors questioned the competence of the Bush Administration. According to the resident assistants,“The recent attacks extend beyond political debate, and for professors to make negative judgments on our government before any action has taken place only fosters a cynical attitude in the classroom.” The administration asked faculty to think hard about what they said. Greg Kneser, dean of students, declared:“There were students who were just scared, and an intellectual discussion of the political ramifications of this was not helpful for them. They were frightened, and they look to their faculty not just for intellectual debate” but as “people they trust.”8 Even hypothetical discussions were suspicious. Portland Community College philosophy professor Stephen Carey challenged students in his critical thinking class to consider an extreme rhetorical proposition that would cause great emotion, like “Bush should be hung, strung up upside down, and left for the buzzards.” One student’s mother, misunderstanding the example, called the FBI and accused Carey of threatening to kill the President, and the Secret Service investigated him.9 When four leftist faculty at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill (UNC) criticized U.S. foreign policy at a teach-in, Scott Rubush of FrontPage magazine, declared, “They’re using state resources to the practical effect of aiding and abetting the Taliban.”The magazine recommended that these faculty be fired. “Tell the good folks at UNC–Chapel Hill what you think of their decision to allow anti-American rallies on their state-supported campus,” FrontPage urged. The administration received hundreds of angry e-mails, and was denounced on the floor of the North Carolina legislature. Several antiwar faculty members received death threats.10 In addition to phys i cal threats and attack s , A rab and Muslim students also faced enormous scru t i ny from the authori t i e s . An October 2001 survey by the Am e ri can Association of Collegiate Registrars and Ad m i s s i ons Officers found thatat least 220 colleges had been contacted by law enforcement in the weeks after 9/11. Police or FBI agents made 99 requests for private “n on - d i re c t o ry ”i n f o rm a t i on ,s u ch as course sch e d u l e s , that under law cannot be released without student con s e n t , a s u b p o e n a , or a pending danger (on ly 12 of the requests had a subpoena, a l t h o u g h the Immigra t i on and Na t u ra l i za t i on Se rvice doesn’t re q u i reconsent for inform a t i on on foreign students). Most requests were for individual students, although 16 requests for student re c o rds were “based on ethnicity. ” Law enforcement re c e i ve d the inform a t i on from 159 sch o o l s , and on ly eight denied any re q u e s t s . I n response to the violence and persecution against Muslim and Arab students, some colleges did try to restrict offensive speech in ways that resulted in threats to academic fre e d om . At Orange Coast Com mu n i ty College (OCC) on September 20, 2001, government professor Ken Hearlson was suspended for 11 weeks after Muslim students accused him of being biased against them and calling them “terrorists.” Hearlson denied the accusation. A tape recording of the class found that the most extreme statements were misheard, although Hearlson did apparently point a finger at Middle Eastern students while he blamed Arab countries for fomenting terrorism.11 In a case at Johns Hopkins University, Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), was demoted (but later reinstated) after a September 14 panel discussion on terrorism in which he criticized Iraq, Pakistan, and Palestinians.12 I n response to the violence and persecution against Muslim and Arab students, some colleges did try to restrict offensive speech in ways that resulted in threats to academic fre e d om . At Orange Coast Com mu n i ty College (OCC) on September 20, 2001, government professor Ken Hearlson was suspended for 11 weeks after Muslim students accused him of being biased against them and calling them “terrorists.” Hearlson denied the accusation. A tape recording of the class found that the most extreme statements were misheard, although Hearlson did apparently point a finger at Middle Eastern students while he blamed Arab countries for fomenting terrorism.11 In a case at Johns Hopkins University, Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), was demoted (but later reinstated) after a September 14 panel discussion on terrorism in which he criticized Iraq, Pakistan, and Palestinians.12 Anti-military views expressed in an e-mail could put a professor’s job at risk. At Chicago’s St. Xavier University, history professor Peter Kirstein sent this response to an Air Force cadet asking him to help promote an Air Force event: “You are a disgrace to this country and I am furious you would even think I would support you and your aggressive baby killing tactics of collateral damage.” Although Kirstein apologized for his e-mail, many called for his dismissal. On November 15, 2002, St. Xavier president Richard Yanikoski announced that Kirstein would be immediately suspended, receive a reprimand, and undergo a post-tenure review during a Spring 2003 sabbatical.13 Another tenured professor was suspended for responding rudely to an unsolicited e-mail and saying that killing is wrong. While conservatives contended that a few cases of censorship proved that left-wing thought police rule over college campuses, my extensive survey of academic freedom and civil liberties at American universities found the opposite: left-wing critics of the Bush Administration suffered by far the most numerous and most serious violations of their civil liberties. Censorship of conservatives was rare, and almost always overturned in the few cases where it occurred. Patriotic correctness—not political correctness—reigned supreme after 9/11.

This is devastating because higher education is the uniquely key institution that can provide spaces for conversations and action that snowball into cultural shifts away from militarism.

Jaschik and Giroux 07, Henry Giroux and Scott Jaschik, 'The University in Chains', (Interview), 2007, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/07/giroux

Q: How do you think the state of academic freedom has changed since 9/11? A: Criticisms of the university as a stronghold of dissent have a long and inglorious history in the United States, extending from attacks in the 19th century by religious fundamentalists to anti-communist witch-hunts conducted in the 1920s, 1930s, and again in the 1950s, during the infamous era of McCarthyism. Harkening back to the infamous McCarthy era, a newly reinvigorated war is currently being waged by Christian nationalists, reactionary neoconservatives, and corporate fundamentalists against the autonomy and integrity of all those independent institutions that foster social responsibility, critical thought, and critical citizenship. While the attack is being waged on numerous fronts, the universities are where the major skirmishes are taking place. What is unique about this attack on academic freedom are the range and scope of the forces waging an assault on higher education. It is much worse today, because corporations, the national security state, the Pentagon, powerful Christian evangelical groups, non-government agencies, and enormously wealthy right-wing individuals and institutions have created powerful alliances -- the perfect storm so to speak -- that are truly threatening the freedoms and semi-autonomy of American universities. Higher education in the United States is currently being targeted by a diverse number of right-wing forces that have assumed political power and are waging an aggressive and focused campaign against the principles of academic freedom, sacrificing critical pedagogical practice in the name of patriotic correctness and dismantling the ideal of the university as a bastion of independent thought, and uncorrupted inquiry. Ironically, it is through the vocabulary of individual rights, academic freedom, balance, and tolerance that these forces are attempting to slander, even vilify, an allegedly liberal and left-oriented professoriate, to cut already meager federal funding for higher education, to eliminate tenure, and to place control of what is taught and said in classrooms under legislative oversight. There is more at work in the current attack than the rampant anti-intellectualism and paranoid style of American politics outlined in Richard Hofstadter’s Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, written over 40 years ago. There is also the collective power of radical right-wing organizations, which in their powerful influence on all levels of government in spite of a democratically controlled Congress and most liberal social institutions feel compelled to dismantle the open, questioning cultures of the academy. Underlying recent attacks on the university is an attempt not merely to counter dissent but to destroy it and in doing so to eliminate all of those remaining public spaces, spheres, and institutions that nourish and sustain a culture of questioning so vital to a democratic civil society. Dissent is often equated with treason; the university is portrayed as the weak link in the war on terror by powerful educational agencies; professors who advocate a culture of questioning and critical engagement run the risk of having their names posted on Internet web sites while being labeled as un-American; and various right-wing individuals and politicians increasingly attempt to pass legislation that renders critical analysis a liability and reinforces, with no irony intended, a rabid anti-intellectualism under the call for balance and intellectual diversity. Genuine politics begins to disappear as people methodically lose those freedoms and rights that enable them to speak, act, dissent, and exercise both their individual right to resistance and a shared sense of collective responsibility. While higher education is only one site, it is one of the most crucial institutional and political spaces where democratic subjects can be shaped, democratic relations can be experienced, and anti-democratic forms of power can be identified and critically engaged. It is also one of the few spaces left where young people can think critically about the knowledge they gain, learn values that refuse to reduce the obligations of citizenship to either consumerism or the dictates of the national security state, and develop the language and skills necessary to defend those institutions and social relations that are vital to a substantive democracy. As the philosopher Hannah Arendt insisted, a meaningful conception of politics appears only when concrete spaces exist for people to come together to talk, think critically, and act on their capacities for empathy, judgment, and social responsibility. What the current attack on higher education threatens is a notion of the academy that is faithful to its role as a crucial democratic public sphere, one that offers a space both to resist the “dark times” in which we now live and to embrace the possibility of a future forged in the civic struggles requisite for a viable democracy.

2 impacts

### A. Cultural shift-

The aff teaches students to refuse the myth of militarism- this creates a cultural shift away from the glorification of violence

Chatterjee & Maira 14 [

Piya Chatterjee, Backstrand Chair and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Scripps College, Sunaina Maira, Professor of Asian American Studies at UC Davis, “The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent,” University of Minnesota Press, 2014] JW

State warfare and militarism have shored up deeply powerful notions of patriotism, intertwined with a politics of race, class, gender, sexuality, and religion , through the culture wars that have embroiled the U.S. academy. The fronts of “hot” and “cold” wars—military, cultural, and academic— have rested on an ideological framework that has defined the “enemy” as a threat to U.S. freedom and democracy. This enemy produced and propped up in the shifting culture wars— earlier the Communist, now the (Muslim) terrorist— has always been both external and internal. The overt policing of knowledge production, exemplified by right-wing groups such as ACTA, reveals an ideological battle cry in the “culture wars” that have burgeoned in the wake of the civil rights movement— and the containment and policing demanded within the academy. Defending the civilizational integrity of the nation requires producing a national subject and citizen by regulating the boundaries of what is permissible and desirable to express in national culture— and in the university. As Readings observed, “In modernity, the University becomes the model of the social bond that ties individuals in a common relation to the idea of the nation-state.” 46 Belonging is figured through the metaphor of patriotic citizenship, in the nation and in the academy, through displays of what Henry Giroux has also called “patriotic correctness”: “an ideology that privileges conformity over critical learning and that represents dissent as something akin to a terrorist act.” 47 This is where the recent culture wars have shaped the politics of what we call academic containment. For right-wing activists, the nation must be fortified by an educational foundation that upholds, at its core, the singular superiority of Western civilization. A nation-state construed as being under attack is in a state of cultural crisis where any sign of disloyalty to the nation is an act of treachery, including acts perceived as intellectual betrayal. The culture wars have worked to uphold a powerful mythology about American democracy and the American Dream and a potent fiction about freedom of expression that in actuality contains academic dissent. This exceptionalist mythology has historically represented the U.S. nation as a beacon of individual liberty and a bulwark against the Evil Empire or Communist bloc ; Third Worldist and left insurgent movements, including uprisings within the United States in the 1960s and 1970s and in Central America in the 1980s; Islamist militancy and anti-imperial movements since the 1980s ; and the threat posed by all of these to the American “way of life.” The battle against Communism, anti-imperial Third Worldism, and so-called Islamofascism entailed regulating and containing movements sympathetic to these forces at home, including intellectuals with left-leaning tendencies and radical scholars or students— all those likely to contaminate young minds and indoctrinate students in “subversive” or “anti-American” ideologies.

Militarism is part of the culture, making people disposable- justifying and creating everyday violence against the Middle Eastern Other. The aff allows student and professors to refuse this culture.

Chatterjee & Maira 2 [Piya Chatterjee, Backstrand Chair and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Scripps College, Sunaina Maira, Professor of Asian American Studies at UC Davis, “The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent,” University of Minnesota Press, 2014] JW

The strategic co-optation of the language of pluralism for academic containment is nowhere more evident than in the assault on progressive scholarship in Middle East studies and postcolonial studies and in the intense culture wars over Islam, the War on Terror, and Israel-Palestine. The 9/ 11 attacks and the heightened Islamophobia they generated allowed Zionist and neoconservative groups to intensify accusations that progressive Middle East studies scholars and scholars critical of U.S. foreign policy were guilty of bias and “ one-sided” partisanship , as observed in accounts of censure, suspicion, and vilification by Abowd, De Genova, and Salaita. The post-9/ 11 culture wars conjured up new and not-sonew phantoms of enemies— in particular , the racialized specter of the “terrorist.” This figure, and the racial panic associated with it, has been sedimented in the national imaginary as synonymous with the “Muslim” and the “Arab” since the Iranian Revolution of 1978– 1979 and the First Intifada against Israeli occupation in the late 1980s. The War on Terror consolidated Orientalist caricatures of Muslim fanatics and Arab militants , but it is important to note that these also dredged up avatars of a historical logic of containment and annihilation of indigenous others. 59 The native, the barbarian, and the foreigner converge in this cultural imaginary that legitimizes violence against anti-Western, uncivilized regions incapable of democratic self-governance and that is produced by expert knowledge of other peoples and regions. The wars in Iraq and “Af-Pak” and the global hunt for terrorists entailed an intensified suspicion and scrutiny of ideologies that supported militant resistance or “anti-American” sentiments and necessitated academic research on communities that were supposedly “breeding grounds” for terrorism. The post-9/ 11 panic about Muslim terrorists and enemy aliens increasingly focused on the threat of “homegrown terrorism” as the War on Terror shifted its focus to “radicalized” communities within the United States, especially Muslim American youth. At the same time, as Godrej observes, the criminalization of those considered threats to national security has included the violent repression of Occupy activists and student protesters and indefinite detention authorized by the PATRIOT (Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act and the National Defense Authorization Act. Protests focused on higher education thus blur into dissent against U.S. warfare and the homeland security state in a climate of heightened campus securitization and university collaboration with the FBI in the interest of “public safety.” Anarchists are considered domestic terror threats to be contained, and Muslim or Arab American students (or faculty) who are also anarchists are subjected to multiple levels of containment and scrutiny, as suggested in the chapter by Falcón et al. Academic containment is clearly part of a larger politics of repression and policing in the national security state that affects faculty and students as well as the campus climate in general.

This outweighs

1. Root Cause- once violence becomes normalized, then anything including the neg impacts can occur and no one cares, making solving them impossible
2. Aggregation- Militarism impacts constantly occur which means they aggregate every single day. By the time the neg impacts occur- the aff will massively outweighs on magnitude.

### B. Political Spillover

Academics have used state resources and their own academic freedom to create positive policy change proving that liberalizing the university creates concrete material impacts

Slaughter 88 [Sheila Slaughter, associate professor in the Center for the Study of Higher Education and director of the Division of Educational Foundations and Administration, The University of Arizona, “Academic Freedom and the State: Reflections on the Uses of Knowledge,” The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 59, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1988), pp. 241-262] JW

In the 1960s and 1970s, definitions of academic knowledge began to broaden. The university curriculum came to include subjects previously treated only in an incidental way-black studies, women's stud- ies, ethnic studies, and multiculturalism. Even China studies reentered the curriculum. The works of Marxists, feminists, anar- chists, and critical thinkers were included in social science courses where more conventional thought had once dominated. Methodologi- cal debates raged: the very possibility of objective knowledge and value-free science was seriously questioned [20, 38]. The expanded, heavily state-funded university provided in large part the resource base for the growth of diverse forms of knowledge. Funds were available for the new departments and new courses, jour- nals, and library subscriptions. Professors were able to sustain these new areas with resources generated within the university. Professors representing broader forms of knowledge were able to make their presence felt in professional associations, many of which developed radical and feminist caucuses in the late 1960s and 1970s [9, 36]. Professors engaged in generating alternative forms of knowledge also exchanged expertise with those outside the university, often using the university as their primary resource base. These external groups contributed symbolic support, some resources and very often used professors' expertise to fuel reform. Professors developing expertise in complementarity with these groups usually offer ideological and technical alternatives to current policy. In the area of foreign policy, for example, professors have worked with a wide variety of external groups to curb United States interventionist policies in Central America, particularly in Nicaragua. In many cases, these groups do more than simply call for an end to war; they present carefully thought-out policy alternatives for the region. Thus, the Institute for Policy Stud- ies drew on a number of professors in writing Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America. A great many professors have endorsed this long-term development plan for the Caribbean Basin. Academics have exchanged expertise with the Institute for Food and Development Policy in attempts to help Central American countries become self-sustaining in terms of food production. organizations such as Americas Watch and Amnesty International of- fer resources for new forms of expertise in Central America as do religious organizations such as Witness for Peace and Pledge of Resis- tance. Central America is only a single instance. State-supported professors exchange expertise with a wide variety of external groups trying to change prevailing policy. Examples of such exchanges are seen in professorial work with critical intellectual centers such as Public In- terest Research Groups, the Council on Economic Priorities, and the Union for Radical Political Economics; with special interest groups such as nuclear disarmament and pro-choice organizations; and with religious groups trying to create new theologies.

Trump renders American unilateralism useless – allies fear a lack of commitment and the rise of China and Russia destroys American hopes for unipolar hegemony. It is try-or-die for a shift towards a more accountable and reflexive American military.

Bremmer 12/19, Bremmer ’16 (Ian Bremmer is the president and founder of Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm. Dec 19, 2016, “The Era of American Global Leadership Is Over. Here's What Comes Next,” <http://time.com/4606071/american-global-leadership-is-over/> |

As in the past, the day will be cold. Melania will hold the Bible. The kids will stand by proudly. The new President will recite his lines carefully, smile broadly and change history. And American international leadership, a constant since 1945, will end with the presidential inauguration of Donald J. Trump on Jan. 20, 2017. That's not because Trump is bound to fail where his predecessors have succeeded. Given the rise of other countries with enough power to shrug off U.S. pressure--and other factors, like the ability of smaller powers to punch above their weight in cyberspace--this moment was inevitable. America will remain the sole superpower for the foreseeable future--only the U.S. can project military muscle, economic clout and cultural influence into every region of the world. But Trump's election marks an irreversible break with the past, one with global implications. For at least the next four years, America's interactions with other nations will be guided not by the conviction that U.S. leadership is good for America and the world but by Trump's transactional approach. This will force friends and foes alike to question every assumption they've made about what Washington will and will not do. Add a more assertive China and Russia to the greater willingness of traditional U.S. allies to hedge their bets on American plans and it's clear that we've reached a turning point. Trump is not an isolationist, but he's certainly a unilateralist, and a proudly selfish one. Even if he wanted to engage the G-7 or G-8 or G-20 to get things done--and he doesn't--it has become unavoidably obvious that the transition toward a leaderless world is now complete. The G-zero era I first predicted nearly six years ago is now fully upon us. No matter how long Trump remains in the White House, a crucial line has been crossed. The fallout will outlive his presidency, because Trump has proved that tens of millions of Americans like this idea. Trump's "America first" approach fundamentally changes the U.S. role in the world. Trump agrees with leaders of both political parties that the U.S. is an exceptional nation, but he insists that the country can't remain exceptional if it keeps stumbling down the path that former Presidents, including Republicans and Democrats, have followed since the end of World War II. Washington's ambition to play the role of indispensable power allows both allies and rivals to treat U.S. taxpayers like chumps, he argues. Better to build a "What's in it for us?" approach to the rest of the world. This is a complete break with a foreign policy establishment that Trump has worked hard to delegitimize--and which he continues to ostracize by waving off charges of Russian interference in the election and by refusing the daily intelligence briefings offered to all Presidents-elect. American power, once a trump card, is now a wild card. Instead of a superpower that wants to impose stability and values on a fractious and valueless global order, the U.S. has become the single biggest source of international uncertainty. And don't expect lawmakers to provide the traditional set of checks and balances. It's not just that the Constitution gives the President great power to conduct foreign policy. It's also that Trump has succeeded politically where his party's establishment has continually failed, and as long as he remains popular with the party's voters, many junior Republican lawmakers will answer to their President rather than to their leaders on Capitol Hill. Expect Trump to use the bully pulpit with a vengeance, often at 140 characters or less, to try to set new rules and rally the faithful to follow his lead. As for special interests, Trump isn't much beholden to Wall Street, Silicon Valley or Big Business, since most didn't support him. Those in the tech class, in particular, are the most liberal of the U.S. business elite, and Trump's intense criticism of Apple for resisting FBI efforts to hack into the cell phones used by the attackers in San Bernardino, Calif., previews plenty of fights to come between the Trump White House and Silicon Valley. Trump has essentially charged Big Business with treason and threatens to punish--individually--those companies that ship jobs overseas. He hasn't yet taken the oath of office, but Trump (and Trumpism) have already begun to create turmoil abroad. In Europe, the new President's full embrace of Brexit sets teeth on edge in many capitals, and his friendly approach to Russia leaves European governments scrambling for security alternatives to NATO. Transatlantic relations have reached their lowest point since the 1930s. In Asia, his confrontational attitude toward China will bolster U.S. ties with allies like Japan and India that have long-term reasons to resist China's rise, but it has already made it that much harder to manage Washington's relations with Beijing, the most important relationship for the future of the global economy. It will also complicate any bid by the U.S. and China to work together, or at least in parallel, when North Korea finally becomes a red-alert-level emergency--which it almost certainly will. But the election of Donald Trump is just the latest source of G-zero uncertainty and turmoil. Few leaders in today's world, particularly in Europe, have enough popularity to get anything done, and the current wave of populism sweeping through many E.U. countries calls into question the legitimacy of institutions and governing principles in the world's most advanced industrial democracies. France will head to the polls in 2017, led by a President too weak to stand in an election in which a leading contender wants to pull the country out of the E.U. In Britain, with European negotiators and members of her own party intent on driving exceptionally hard bargains, it's far from clear that Prime Minister Theresa May can navigate her divided country through (at least) two years of Brexit negotiations. In Germany, the lack of any appealing alternative will probably keep Angela Merkel as Chancellor, but domestic backlash against her open-door policy for Middle East migrants will leave her much weakened. In Italy, the failure of Matteo Renzi's political-reform referendum has upended politics, dooming the country's 64th government in 70 years. Greece's financial problems are far from finished. The E.U. is in for a rough ride in 2017, even if its deal with Turkey to sharply limit the surge of Syrian refugees into Europe holds, helping avoid a repeat of the tidal wave of desperate people that roiled E.U. politics. While there are places where the risk is overblown, the outlook isn't much brighter in the developing world. The latest round of tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has made headlines, but both governments want to avoid an escalation of violence that might hurt them at home. In Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country, the capital city's Christian governor has aroused Muslim fury, but President Joko Widodo continues to promote economic reform and much-needed investment in the country's infrastructure. China's top leaders have become increasingly confident in their ability to maintain their monopoly on domestic political power and to develop stronger international relationships with willing partners. But a scheduled leadership transition next fall might create much higher levels of stress in Beijing and a more belligerent attitude from its leaders--particularly if China's economy begins to show unexpected vulnerability. With that backdrop, Trump's hostile approach, including treating U.S. policy on Taiwan as a card to play, will generate anxiety. Vladimir Putin remains firmly in charge in Moscow, and Trump's win provides an unexpected bonus in better relations with the White House. We might even see an easing, if not an end, of Western sanctions in 2017. But oil prices won't reach the heights that boosted the Russian economy a decade ago, which exposes a longer-term vulnerability for which Putin has no credible answer. He has more than enough political and financial capital to avoid serious trouble in 2017, but the long-term erosion of Russia's power and financial reserves will eventually give Putin good reasons to create international distractions. In Mexico, hostility toward (and from) Trump is already stirring up trouble. And economic crisis and political confrontation are headed toward a potentially violent climax in Venezuela. Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a would-be Putin bent on expanding his authority, has expressed growing hostility toward E.U. leaders who depend on his goodwill to limit migrant flows. South Africa's scandal-plagued President continues to ignite partisan passions. Protests, a staple of the country's political culture, have again turned violent. No region feels the G-zero pressure more acutely than the Middle East. In Saudi Arabia, low oil prices, Iran's release from sanctions, a lack of reliable friends and rivalries within the royal family are creating ever higher levels of stress. The killing continues in Yemen and in Syria, where Bashar Assad has all but conquered Aleppo. Finally, the military defeat of ISIS will scatter surviving fighters across the Middle East, North Africa, East Africa, Southeast Asia, Europe, Russia and elsewhere in search of opportunities to wage jihad on new battlefields. While America's withdrawal will create uncertainty, no one is rushing in to fill the vacuum. China's investments in Asia, Africa and Latin America boost Beijing's influence in dozens of countries, and Trump's renunciation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an enormous trade deal, gives China an excellent opportunity to expand its web of regional trade ties. But Beijing can't match Washington's military reach or cultural appeal. It's not a major producer of energy, food or the latest advanced technology. And China's leaders have their hands full at home. They must ensure that the nation's economy continues to develop and modernize to maintain their monopoly of domestic political power. The reality is that there is no emerging power ready, willing and able to take the leadership role the U.S. will no longer play. Around the world, populism will decentralize power away from central state actors toward local officials, at the expense of international cooperation. This anger undermines the authority of supranational organizations--the E.U., NATO, the U.N. The pace of technological change threatens the ability of governments to govern. An ever growing number of major decisions are taken by nonstate actors--data-hungry companies, hackers, political interest groups and terrorists. The international order itself is unraveling. In the past eight years alone, the world has seen the worst financial crisis in decades, a global recession, a historic debt crisis in the euro zone, a wave of unrest across North Africa and the Middle East, civil war in Syria, a migrant crisis that calls into question the future of Europe's open borders, war between Russia and Ukraine, Brexit, an explosion of cyber aggression and the election as U.S. President of one Donald Trump. Call it geopolitical creative destruction or just the sound of things falling apart, but the grinding of G-zero gears has become too loud to ignore. In the short term, 2017 will have more than its share of decisive political moments. France will stage the most anticipated presidential election in years this spring, with the country's future as a European pillar at stake. Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Front hopes to ride Europe's populist wave toward victory--and sound the death knell for the entire E.U. project. In the fall, Merkel, the last-standing champion of Western liberal values, seeks re-election as Germany's Chancellor. Both countries fear that Russian hackers will try to disrupt their elections, just as Moscow is suspected of having done in the U.S. There will also be a presidential election in Iran that might well bring tensions between reformers and hard-liners in that country to a head. Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and others will continue to seek solutions to the existential threat posed to their economies by persistently low oil prices. Angry words between Europe and Turkey will threaten a new surge of migrants across E.U. borders. China's leadership transition will make Beijing a more unpredictable player in regional and international politics. And President Donald Trump will lead the United States of America into uncharted waters.

## Part 4 is Theory

1. Education is a voter- it’s the main value we get from debate and is the reason schools fund it.

2. Vote aff if I win a counter-interp

a. AFF flex – negative has the ability to win on either layer so the aff needs the same ability in the 2ar. 2AR is too short to win a new shell and play defense against the 2NR theory arguments so the AFF needs reciprocal layers rather than adding more unreciprocal avenues. That’s not a problem in the long 2nr.

b. reciprocity- Only the neg can read T because only the aff has a burden to be topical. Thus the aff needs an RVI to compensate for the neg’s unique avenue to the ballot.

3. Spec-ing a type of speech is good-

SCOTUS ruled that “any” implies limits on the object they refer to.

Von Eintel 11 Kai Von Fintel, 7-6-2011, "Justice Breyer, Professor Austin, and the Meaning of 'Any'," Language Log, <http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3248>

When I see the word "any" in a statute, I immediately know it's unlikely to mean "anything" in the universe. "Any" will have a limitation on it, depending on the context. When my wife says, "there isn't any butter," I understand that she's talking about what is in our refrigerator, not worldwide. We look at context over and over, in life and in law. Austin suggests that there is good reason to look beyond text to context. Context is very important when you examine a statement or law. A statement made by Congress, under certain formal conditions, becomes a law. Context helps us interpret language, including the language of a statute. Purpose is often an important part of context. So Austin probably encourages me to put more weight on purpose. It is very interesting that Breyer should choose the word "any" as an example of why context matters. A few years back, there was in fact a Supreme Court decision (Small v. United States) that hinged on the meaning of "any" (pdf of the decision here]). And as it turns out, Justice Breyer wrote the decision for the majority (made up of Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg; ah the good old days). The background: Petitioner Small was convicted in a Japanese Court of trying to smuggle firearms and ammunition into that country. He served five years in prison and then returned to the United States, where he bought a gun. Federal authorities subsequently charged Small under 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1), which forbids "any person … convicted in any court … of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year … to … possess … any firearm." Small subsequently argued that any court was not meant to encompass foreign courts, only domestic ones. The Supreme Court agreed. The arguments in the decision are a good case study of semantics/pragmatics in the real (well, legal) world. Here are some excerpts: The question before us is whether the statutory reference "convicted in any court" includes a conviction entered in a foreign court. The word "any" considered alone cannot answer this question. In ordinary life, a speaker who says, "I'll see any film," may or may not mean to include films shown in another city. In law, a legislature that uses the statutory phrase " 'any person' " may or may not mean to include " 'persons' " outside "the jurisdiction of the state." See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (Marshall, C. J.) ("[G]eneral words," such as the word "'any,' " must "be limited" in their application "to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them"); Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U. S. 125, 132 (2004) (" 'any' " means "different things depending upon the setting"); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 357 (1994) ("[R]espondent errs in placing dispositive weight on the broad statutory reference to 'any' law enforcement officer or agency without considering the rest of the statute"); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1981) (it is doubtful that the phrase " 'any statute' " includes the very statute in which the words appear); Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 149 (1960) ("[A]ny sum," while a "catchall" phase, does not "define what it catches"). Thus, even though the word "any" demands a broad interpretation, see, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997), we must look beyond that word itself.

Net benefits

a. advocacy shift- without spec the aff can shift out of disads by saying specific harms don’t link to general principle or by claiming something isn’t CPS-kills fairness since if arguments can be shifted the neg has no shot of winning.

b. Impact turn limits, Research overload is good- Gives us the skills to shift through massive data in the information era

McCandless 10, David, award-winning writer, designer and author August 2010, David McCandless: The beauty of data visualization, http://www.ted.com/talks/david\_mccandless\_the\_beauty\_of\_data\_visualization.html#

**It feels like we're** all **suffering** from information overloador data glut. And the good news is there might be an easy solution to that, and that's using our eyes more. So, visualizing information, so that we can **see the patterns and connections that matter** and then designing that information so it makes more sense, or it tells a story, or **allows us to focus** only **on** the **info**rmation **that's important**. Failing that, visualized information can just look really cool.

4. Debate has no constitutive rules- every debate is functionally a new version of the activity- takes out textuality arguments on T since they beg the question of why we care about the pre-given rules.

Enoch David Enoch “Shmagency Revisited” 2011

But one may want to reject this initial claim, even with regard to chess. For it may be suggested that playing chess does after all suffice for having a reason – some reason, at least, perhaps a weak one, perhaps one that is outweighed by others – for checkmating your opponent. Perhaps there is no need after all for another reason, namely, a reason to be playing chess (or perhaps to play this specific game of chess)? If so, we may proceed to conclude that our merely playing the agency-game suffices for us having a reason to aim at its constitutive aims. As a general thesis, though, this cannot be true. We can define many cooked-up variations of chess, with slightly different rules, or perhaps slightly different ways of winning (say, you only win if you checkmate your opponent in an even number of moves; or when she still has her queen; or when she looks away; or cases in which you win if you move your castle diagonally three times when your opponent looks away; etc.). Whenever you find yourself playing chess, you also find yourself (in sufficiently early stages of the game) playing these cooked-up games chess\*, chess\*\*, chess\*\*\*, and so on. But it doesn't seem you have reasons to win at chess\*, or at chess\*\*, or at chess\*\*\*. This is so, presumably, because you don't have a reason to play chess\*, or chess\*\*, or chess\*\*\*. So this little example suffices to show that it's not in general true that engaging in some activity – satisfying some relevant descriptive criteria – suffices for having reason to aim at its constitutive aim. So if you think that the game of agency is different – if you think, in other words, that playing it suffices for having a reason to play it well, or to achieve its constitutive aims, or some such – then you must be able to come up with an answer to the question: What's so special about agency? Why is this true of agency, even though it's not true in general? I can’t think of an answer to this question (except perhaps in terms of inescapability, to which we will return shortly).

## Part 5 is Method

1. The aff deploys a heuristic to learn scenario planning- even if politics and colleges are bad, scenario analysis of policies is pedagogically valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills

Barma et al 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>)

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present

## Versus Util Debaters

## Part 1 is Framing

Patriotic Correctness on campuses runs rampant- dissent is charged with treason and lines of critical thought are silenced. Higher education has been coopted by the military industrial complex, reducing the roles of teachers to mere technicians. The role of the ballot is to vote for the advocacy that best takes back the university from militarism. Educators should reject the call of abstraction and open up everything for contestation.

Giroux 13, Henry, Public Intellectuals Against the Neoliberal University, 2013, <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/19654-public-intellectuals-against-the-neoliberal-university>

Increasingly, as universities are shaped by an audit culture, the call to be objective and impartial, whatever one's intentions, can easily echo what George Orwell called the official truth or the establishment point of view. Lacking a self-consciously democratic political focus, teachers are often reduced, or reduce themselves, to the role of a technician or functionary engaged in formalistic rituals, unconcerned with the disturbing and urgent problems that confront the larger society or the consequences of one's pedagogical practices and research undertakings. Hiding behind appeals to balance and objectivity, too many scholars refuse to recognize that being committed to something does not cancel out what C. Wright Mills once called hard thinking. Teaching needs to be rigorous, self-reflective, and committed not to the dead zone of instrumental rationality but to the practice of freedom, to a critical sensibility capable of advancing the parameters of knowledge, addressing crucial social issues, and connecting private troubles and public issues. In opposition to the instrumental model of teaching, with its conceit of political neutrality and its fetishization of measurement, I argue that academics should combine the mutually interdependent roles of critical educator and active citizen. This requires finding ways to connect the practice of classroom teaching with important social problems and the operation of power in the larger society while providing the conditions for students to view themselves as critical agents capable of making those who exercise authority and power answerable for their actions. Higher education cannot be decoupled from what Jacques Derrida calls a democracy to come, that is, a democracy that must always "be open to the possibility of being contested, of contesting itself, of criticizing and indefinitely improving itself."33 Within this project of possibility and impossibility, critical pedagogy must be understood as a deliberately informed and purposeful political and moral practice, as opposed to one that is either doctrinaire, instrumentalized or both. Moreover, a critical pedagogy should also gain part of its momentum in higher education among students who will go back to the schools, churches, synagogues and workplaces to produce new ideas, concepts and critical ways of understanding the world in which young people and adults live. This is a notion of intellectual practice and responsibility that refuses the professional neutrality and privileged isolation of the academy. It also affirms a broader vision of learning that links knowledge to the power of self-definition and to the capacities of students to expand the scope of democratic freedoms, particularly those that address the crisis of education, politics, and the social as part and parcel of the crisis of democracy itself. In order for critical pedagogy, dialogue and thought to have real effects, they must advocate that all citizens, old and young, are equally entitled, if not equally empowered, to shape the society in which they live. This is a commitment we heard articulated by the brave students who fought tuition hikes and the destruction of civil liberties and social provisions in Quebec and to a lesser degree in the Occupy Wall Street movement. If educators are to function as public intellectuals, they need to listen to young people who are producing a new language in order to talk about inequality and power relations, attempting to create alternative democratic public spaces, rethinking the very nature of politics, and asking serious questions about what democracy is and why it no longer exists in many neoliberal societies. These young people who are protesting the 1% recognize that they have been written out of the discourses of justice, equality and democracy and are not only resisting how neoliberalism has made them expendable, they are arguing for a collective future very different from the one that is on display in the current political and economic systems in which they feel trapped. These brave youth are insisting that the relationship between knowledge and power can be emancipatory, that their histories and experiences matter, and that what they say and do counts in their struggle to unlearn dominating privileges, productively reconstruct their relations with others, and transform, when necessary, the world around them.

## Part 2 is Advocacy

Plan text, Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict constitutionally protected speech that criticizes the military’s policies.

## Part 3 is Offense

In the status quo, members of college campuses are routinely fired if they criticize the military, causing a chilling effect on such discussion. Multiple empirical examples prove:

Wilson 15, John K., Ph.D candidate with dissertation on the history of academic freedom in America and author of three books, “Patriotic Correctness: Academic Freedom and Its Enemies,” Routledge, Nov 30, 2015

Compared to earlier “wartime” situations, academic freedom is far more protected today than at any time in the past. But the danger posed to academic freedom cannot be ignored. Efforts to silence faculty and students, even when they are unsuccessful, can make others around the country more reluctant to speak openly. Only by denouncing all efforts at censorship and vigorously defending the right of freedom on college campuses, can we continue to protect academic freedom. The cliché of our times, constantly repeated but often true, is that 9/11 “changed everything.” One thing that it changed was academic freedom. The controversy over the limits of free speech on college campuses across the nation began immediately. On the morning of September 11, 2001, University of New Mexico history professor Richard Berthold joked with his class, “Anyone who would blow up the Pentagon would have my vote.” Berthold received death threats, keeping him off campus. On September 27, an unidentified person left a message on the provost’s voice-mail saying if Berthold were not “ousted” within 24 hours, Berthold would be ousted by other sources. Berthold was threatened in front of his home by a biker who came at him screaming obscenities, and he received several angry e-mails and letters with messages such as “I’d like to blow you up.” New Mexico state representative William Fuller declared,“Treason is giving aide or comfort to the enemy. Any terrorist who heard Berthold’s comment was comforted.” In the end, Berthold was pressured to retire from his job because of those 11 words he spoke on 9/11.Mohammad Rahat, an Iranian citizen and University of Miami medical technician who turned 22 years old on September 11, 2001, declared in a meeting that day, “Some birthday gift from Osama bin Laden.” Although Rahat said that he meant it “in a sarcastic way,” Rahat was suspended and then fired on September 25, 2001. Paula Musto, vice president of university relations, declared that Rahat’s “comments were deeply disturbing to his co-workers and superiors at the medical school. They were inappropriate and unbecoming for someone working in a research laboratory. He was fired because he made those comments, certainly not because of his ethnic background.” Rahat had received only positive evaluation in 13 months working in the lab. 6 At the University of California at Los Angeles, library assistant Jonnie Hargis was suspended without pay for one week after sending an e-mail response criticizing American policies in Iraq and Israel. Hargis’ union successfully pursued a grievance; Hargis was repaid for his lost income, the incident was stricken from his job record, and the university was forced to clarify its e-mail policies.7On September 13, 2001, two resident assistants in Minnesota complained to the dean of students that undergraduates felt fearful and uneasy because some professors questioned the competence of the Bush Administration. According to the resident assistants,“The recent attacks extend beyond political debate, and for professors to make negative judgments on our government before any action has taken place only fosters a cynical attitude in the classroom.” The administration asked faculty to think hard about what they said. Greg Kneser, dean of students, declared:“There were students who were just scared, and an intellectual discussion of the political ramifications of this was not helpful for them. They were frightened, and they look to their faculty not just for intellectual debate” but as “people they trust.”8 Even hypothetical discussions were suspicious. Portland Community College philosophy professor Stephen Carey challenged students in his critical thinking class to consider an extreme rhetorical proposition that would cause great emotion, like “Bush should be hung, strung up upside down, and left for the buzzards.” One student’s mother, misunderstanding the example, called the FBI and accused Carey of threatening to kill the President, and the Secret Service investigated him.9 When four leftist faculty at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill (UNC) criticized U.S. foreign policy at a teach-in, Scott Rubush of FrontPage magazine, declared, “They’re using state resources to the practical effect of aiding and abetting the Taliban.”The magazine recommended that these faculty be fired. “Tell the good folks at UNC–Chapel Hill what you think of their decision to allow anti-American rallies on their state-supported campus,” FrontPage urged. The administration received hundreds of angry e-mails, and was denounced on the floor of the North Carolina legislature. Several antiwar faculty members received death threats.10 In addition to phys i cal threats and attack s , A rab and Muslim students also faced enormous scru t i ny from the authori t i e s . An October 2001 survey by the Am e ri can Association of Collegiate Registrars and Ad m i s s i ons Officers found thatat least 220 colleges had been contacted by law enforcement in the weeks after 9/11. Police or FBI agents made 99 requests for private “n on - d i re c t o ry ”i n f o rm a t i on ,s u ch as course sch e d u l e s , that under law cannot be released without student con s e n t , a s u b p o e n a , or a pending danger (on ly 12 of the requests had a subpoena, a l t h o u g h the Immigra t i on and Na t u ra l i za t i on Se rvice doesn’t re q u i reconsent for inform a t i on on foreign students). Most requests were for individual students, although 16 requests for student re c o rds were “based on ethnicity. ” Law enforcement re c e i ve d the inform a t i on from 159 sch o o l s , and on ly eight denied any re q u e s t s . I n response to the violence and persecution against Muslim and Arab students, some colleges did try to restrict offensive speech in ways that resulted in threats to academic fre e d om . At Orange Coast Com mu n i ty College (OCC) on September 20, 2001, government professor Ken Hearlson was suspended for 11 weeks after Muslim students accused him of being biased against them and calling them “terrorists.” Hearlson denied the accusation. A tape recording of the class found that the most extreme statements were misheard, although Hearlson did apparently point a finger at Middle Eastern students while he blamed Arab countries for fomenting terrorism.11 In a case at Johns Hopkins University, Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), was demoted (but later reinstated) after a September 14 panel discussion on terrorism in which he criticized Iraq, Pakistan, and Palestinians.12 I n response to the violence and persecution against Muslim and Arab students, some colleges did try to restrict offensive speech in ways that resulted in threats to academic fre e d om . At Orange Coast Com mu n i ty College (OCC) on September 20, 2001, government professor Ken Hearlson was suspended for 11 weeks after Muslim students accused him of being biased against them and calling them “terrorists.” Hearlson denied the accusation. A tape recording of the class found that the most extreme statements were misheard, although Hearlson did apparently point a finger at Middle Eastern students while he blamed Arab countries for fomenting terrorism.11 In a case at Johns Hopkins University, Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), was demoted (but later reinstated) after a September 14 panel discussion on terrorism in which he criticized Iraq, Pakistan, and Palestinians.12 Anti-military views expressed in an e-mail could put a professor’s job at risk. At Chicago’s St. Xavier University, history professor Peter Kirstein sent this response to an Air Force cadet asking him to help promote an Air Force event: “You are a disgrace to this country and I am furious you would even think I would support you and your aggressive baby killing tactics of collateral damage.” Although Kirstein apologized for his e-mail, many called for his dismissal. On November 15, 2002, St. Xavier president Richard Yanikoski announced that Kirstein would be immediately suspended, receive a reprimand, and undergo a post-tenure review during a Spring 2003 sabbatical.13 Another tenured professor was suspended for responding rudely to an unsolicited e-mail and saying that killing is wrong. While conservatives contended that a few cases of censorship proved that left-wing thought police rule over college campuses, my extensive survey of academic freedom and civil liberties at American universities found the opposite: left-wing critics of the Bush Administration suffered by far the most numerous and most serious violations of their civil liberties. Censorship of conservatives was rare, and almost always overturned in the few cases where it occurred. Patriotic correctness—not political correctness—reigned supreme after 9/11.

This is devastating because higher education is the uniquely key institution that can provide spaces for conversations and action that snowball into cultural shifts away from militarism. History proves, anti-military dissent has always been silenced when the State is hell-bent on imposing its agenda and quieting opposition. Voting aff helps teach students to refuse complicity with militarism

Jaschik and Giroux 07, Henry Giroux and Scott Jaschik, 'The University in Chains', (Interview), 2007, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/07/giroux

Q: How do you think the state of academic freedom has changed since 9/11? A: Criticisms of the university as a stronghold of dissent have a long and inglorious history in the United States, extending from attacks in the 19th century by religious fundamentalists to anti-communist witch-hunts conducted in the 1920s, 1930s, and again in the 1950s, during the infamous era of McCarthyism. Harkening back to the infamous McCarthy era, a newly reinvigorated war is currently being waged by Christian nationalists, reactionary neoconservatives, and corporate fundamentalists against the autonomy and integrity of all those independent institutions that foster social responsibility, critical thought, and critical citizenship. While the attack is being waged on numerous fronts, the universities are where the major skirmishes are taking place. What is unique about this attack on academic freedom are the range and scope of the forces waging an assault on higher education. It is much worse today, because corporations, the national security state, the Pentagon, powerful Christian evangelical groups, non-government agencies, and enormously wealthy right-wing individuals and institutions have created powerful alliances -- the perfect storm so to speak -- that are truly threatening the freedoms and semi-autonomy of American universities. Higher education in the United States is currently being targeted by a diverse number of right-wing forces that have assumed political power and are waging an aggressive and focused campaign against the principles of academic freedom, sacrificing critical pedagogical practice in the name of patriotic correctness and dismantling the ideal of the university as a bastion of independent thought, and uncorrupted inquiry. Ironically, it is through the vocabulary of individual rights, academic freedom, balance, and tolerance that these forces are attempting to slander, even vilify, an allegedly liberal and left-oriented professoriate, to cut already meager federal funding for higher education, to eliminate tenure, and to place control of what is taught and said in classrooms under legislative oversight. There is more at work in the current attack than the rampant anti-intellectualism and paranoid style of American politics outlined in Richard Hofstadter’s *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life,* written over 40 years ago. There is also the collective power of radical right-wing organizations, which in their powerful influence on all levels of government in spite of a democratically controlled Congress and most liberal social institutions feel compelled to dismantle the open, questioning cultures of the academy. Underlying recent attacks on the university is an attempt not merely to counter dissent but to destroy it and in doing so to eliminate all of those remaining public spaces, spheres, and institutions that nourish and sustain a culture of questioning so vital to a democratic civil society. Dissent is often equated with treason; the university is portrayed as the weak link in the war on terror by powerful educational agencies; professors who advocate a culture of questioning and critical engagement run the risk of having their names posted on Internet web sites while being labeled as un-American; and various right-wing individuals and politicians increasingly attempt to pass legislation that renders critical analysis a liability and reinforces, with no irony intended, a rabid anti-intellectualism under the call for balance and intellectual diversity. Genuine politics begins to disappear as people methodically lose those freedoms and rights that enable them to speak, act, dissent, and exercise both their individual right to resistance and a shared sense of collective responsibility. While higher education is only one site, it is one of the most crucial institutional and political spaces where democratic subjects can be shaped, democratic relations can be experienced, and anti-democratic forms of power can be identified and critically engaged. It is also one of the few spaces left where young people can think critically about the knowledge they gain, learn values that refuse to reduce the obligations of citizenship to either consumerism or the dictates of the national security state, and develop the language and skills necessary to defend those institutions and social relations that are vital to a substantive democracy. As the philosopher Hannah Arendt insisted, a meaningful conception of politics appears only when concrete spaces exist for people to come together to talk, think critically, and act on their capacities for empathy, judgment, and social responsibility. What the current attack on higher education threatens is a notion of the academy that is faithful to its role as a crucial democratic public sphere, one that offers a space both to resist the “dark times” in which we now live and to embrace the possibility of a future forged in the civic struggles requisite for a viable democracy.

2 impacts

### A. Cultural shift-

The aff teaches students to refuse the myth of militarism- this creates a cultural shift away from the glorification of violence

Chatterjee & Maira 14 [Piya Chatterjee, Backstrand Chair and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Scripps College, Sunaina Maira, Professor of Asian American Studies at UC Davis, “The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent,” University of Minnesota Press, 2014] JW

State warfare and militarism have shored up deeply powerful notions of patriotism, intertwined with a politics of race, class, gender, sexuality, and religion , through the culture wars that have embroiled the U.S. academy. The fronts of “hot” and “cold” wars—military, cultural, and academic— have rested on an ideological framework that has defined the “enemy” as a threat to U.S. freedom and democracy. This enemy produced and propped up in the shifting culture wars— earlier the Communist, now the (Muslim) terrorist— has always been both external and internal. The overt policing of knowledge production, exemplified by right-wing groups such as ACTA, reveals an ideological battle cry in the “culture wars” that have burgeoned in the wake of the civil rights movement— and the containment and policing demanded within the academy. Defending the civilizational integrity of the nation requires producing a national subject and citizen by regulating the boundaries of what is permissible and desirable to express in national culture— and in the university. As Readings observed, “In modernity, the University becomes the model of the social bond that ties individuals in a common relation to the idea of the nation-state.” 46 Belonging is figured through the metaphor of patriotic citizenship, in the nation and in the academy, through displays of what Henry Giroux has also called “patriotic correctness”: “an ideology that privileges conformity over critical learning and that represents dissent as something akin to a terrorist act.” 47 This is where the recent culture wars have shaped the politics of what we call academic containment. For right-wing activists, the nation must be fortified by an educational foundation that upholds, at its core, the singular superiority of Western civilization. A nation-state construed as being under attack is in a state of cultural crisis where any sign of disloyalty to the nation is an act of treachery, including acts perceived as intellectual betrayal. The culture wars have worked to uphold a powerful mythology about American democracy and the American Dream and a potent fiction about freedom of expression that in actuality contains academic dissent. This exceptionalist mythology has historically represented the U.S. nation as a beacon of individual liberty and a bulwark against the Evil Empire or Communist bloc ; Third Worldist and left insurgent movements, including uprisings within the United States in the 1960s and 1970s and in Central America in the 1980s; Islamist militancy and anti-imperial movements since the 1980s ; and the threat posed by all of these to the American “way of life.” The battle against Communism, anti-imperial Third Worldism, and so-called Islamofascism entailed regulating and containing movements sympathetic to these forces at home, including intellectuals with left-leaning tendencies and radical scholars or students— all those likely to contaminate young minds and indoctrinate students in “subversive” or “anti-American” ideologies.

Militarism is part of the culture, making people disposable- justifying and creating everyday violence against the Middle Eastern Other. The aff allows student and professors to refuse this culture.

Chatterjee & Maira 2 [Piya Chatterjee, Backstrand Chair and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Scripps College, Sunaina Maira, Professor of Asian American Studies at UC Davis, “The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent,” University of Minnesota Press, 2014] JW

The strategic co-optation of the language of pluralism for academic containment is nowhere more evident than in the assault on progressive scholarship in Middle East studies and postcolonial studies and in the intense culture wars over Islam, the War on Terror, and Israel-Palestine. The 9/ 11 attacks and the heightened Islamophobia they generated allowed Zionist and neoconservative groups to intensify accusations that progressive Middle East studies scholars and scholars critical of U.S. foreign policy were guilty of bias and “ one-sided” partisanship , as observed in accounts of censure, suspicion, and vilification by Abowd, De Genova, and Salaita. The post-9/ 11 culture wars conjured up new and not-sonew phantoms of enemies— in particular , the racialized specter of the “terrorist.” This figure, and the racial panic associated with it, has been sedimented in the national imaginary as synonymous with the “Muslim” and the “Arab” since the Iranian Revolution of 1978– 1979 and the First Intifada against Israeli occupation in the late 1980s. The War on Terror consolidated Orientalist caricatures of Muslim fanatics and Arab militants , but it is important to note that these also dredged up avatars of a historical logic of containment and annihilation of indigenous others. 59 The native, the barbarian, and the foreigner converge in this cultural imaginary that legitimizes violence against anti-Western, uncivilized regions incapable of democratic self-governance and that is produced by expert knowledge of other peoples and regions. The wars in Iraq and “Af-Pak” and the global hunt for terrorists entailed an intensified suspicion and scrutiny of ideologies that supported militant resistance or “anti-American” sentiments and necessitated academic research on communities that were supposedly “breeding grounds” for terrorism. The post-9/ 11 panic about Muslim terrorists and enemy aliens increasingly focused on the threat of “homegrown terrorism” as the War on Terror shifted its focus to “radicalized” communities within the United States, especially Muslim American youth. At the same time, as Godrej observes, the criminalization of those considered threats to national security has included the violent repression of Occupy activists and student protesters and indefinite detention authorized by the PATRIOT (Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act and the National Defense Authorization Act. Protests focused on higher education thus blur into dissent against U.S. warfare and the homeland security state in a climate of heightened campus securitization and university collaboration with the FBI in the interest of “public safety.” Anarchists are considered domestic terror threats to be contained, and Muslim or Arab American students (or faculty) who are also anarchists are subjected to multiple levels of containment and scrutiny, as suggested in the chapter by Falcón et al. Academic containment is clearly part of a larger politics of repression and policing in the national security state that affects faculty and students as well as the campus climate in general.

This outweighs

1. Root Cause- once violence becomes normalized, then anything including the neg impacts can occur and no one cares, making solving them impossible
2. Aggregation- Militarism impacts constantly occur which means they aggregate every single day. By the time the neg impacts occur- the aff will massively outweighs on magnitude.

### B. Political Spillover

Academics have used state resources and their own academic freedom to create positive policy change proving that liberalizing the university creates concrete material impacts

Slaughter 88 [Sheila Slaughter, associate professor in the Center for the Study of Higher Education and director of the Division of Educational Foundations and Administration, The University of Arizona, “Academic Freedom and the State: Reflections on the Uses of Knowledge,” The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 59, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1988), pp. 241-262] JW

In the 1960s and 1970s, definitions of academic knowledge began to broaden. The university curriculum came to include subjects previously treated only in an incidental way-black studies, women's stud- ies, ethnic studies, and multiculturalism. Even China studies reentered the curriculum. The works of Marxists, feminists, anar- chists, and critical thinkers were included in social science courses where more conventional thought had once dominated. Methodologi- cal debates raged: the very possibility of objective knowledge and value-free science was seriously questioned [20, 38]. The expanded, heavily state-funded university provided in large part the resource base for the growth of diverse forms of knowledge. Funds were available for the new departments and new courses, jour- nals, and library subscriptions. Professors were able to sustain these new areas with resources generated within the university. Professors representing broader forms of knowledge were able to make their presence felt in professional associations, many of which developed radical and feminist caucuses in the late 1960s and 1970s [9, 36]. Professors engaged in generating alternative forms of knowledge also exchanged expertise with those outside the university, often using the university as their primary resource base. These external groups contributed symbolic support, some resources and very often used professors' expertise to fuel reform. Professors developing expertise in complementarity with these groups usually offer ideological and technical alternatives to current policy. In the area of foreign policy, for example, professors have worked with a wide variety of external groups to curb United States interventionist policies in Central America, particularly in Nicaragua. In many cases, these groups do more than simply call for an end to war; they present carefully thought-out policy alternatives for the region. Thus, the Institute for Policy Stud- ies drew on a number of professors in writing Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America. A great many professors have endorsed this long-term development plan for the Caribbean Basin. Academics have exchanged expertise with the Institute for Food and Development Policy in attempts to help Central American countries become self-sustaining in terms of food production. organizations such as Americas Watch and Amnesty International of- fer resources for new forms of expertise in Central America as do religious organizations such as Witness for Peace and Pledge of Resis- tance. Central America is only a single instance. State-supported professors exchange expertise with a wide variety of external groups trying to change prevailing policy. Examples of such exchanges are seen in professorial work with critical intellectual centers such as Public In- terest Research Groups, the Council on Economic Priorities, and the Union for Radical Political Economics; with special interest groups such as nuclear disarmament and pro-choice organizations; and with religious groups trying to create new theologies.

Trump renders American unilateralism useless – allies fear a lack of commitment and the rise of China and Russia destroys American hopes for unipolar hegemony. It is try-or-die for a shift towards a more accountable and reflexive American military.

Bremmer 12/19, Bremmer ’16 (Ian Bremmer is the president and founder of Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm. Dec 19, 2016, “The Era of American Global Leadership Is Over. Here's What Comes Next,” <http://time.com/4606071/american-global-leadership-is-over/> |

As in the past, the day will be cold. Melania will hold the Bible. The kids will stand by proudly. The new President will recite his lines carefully, smile broadly and change history. And American international leadership, a constant since 1945, will end with the presidential inauguration of Donald J. Trump on Jan. 20, 2017. That's not because Trump is bound to fail where his predecessors have succeeded. Given the rise of other countries with enough power to shrug off U.S. pressure--and other factors, like the ability of smaller powers to punch above their weight in cyberspace--this moment was inevitable. America will remain the sole superpower for the foreseeable future--only the U.S. can project military muscle, economic clout and cultural influence into every region of the world. But Trump's election marks an irreversible break with the past, one with global implications. For at least the next four years, America's interactions with other nations will be guided not by the conviction that U.S. leadership is good for America and the world but by Trump's transactional approach. This will force friends and foes alike to question every assumption they've made about what Washington will and will not do. Add a more assertive China and Russia to the greater willingness of traditional U.S. allies to hedge their bets on American plans and it's clear that we've reached a turning point. Trump is not an isolationist, but he's certainly a unilateralist, and a proudly selfish one. Even if he wanted to engage the G-7 or G-8 or G-20 to get things done--and he doesn't--it has become unavoidably obvious that the transition toward a leaderless world is now complete. The G-zero era I first predicted nearly six years ago is now fully upon us. No matter how long Trump remains in the White House, a crucial line has been crossed. The fallout will outlive his presidency, because Trump has proved that tens of millions of Americans like this idea. Trump's "America first" approach fundamentally changes the U.S. role in the world. Trump agrees with leaders of both political parties that the U.S. is an exceptional nation, but he insists that the country can't remain exceptional if it keeps stumbling down the path that former Presidents, including Republicans and Democrats, have followed since the end of World War II. Washington's ambition to play the role of indispensable power allows both allies and rivals to treat U.S. taxpayers like chumps, he argues. Better to build a "What's in it for us?" approach to the rest of the world. This is a complete break with a foreign policy establishment that Trump has worked hard to delegitimize--and which he continues to ostracize by waving off charges of Russian interference in the election and by refusing the daily intelligence briefings offered to all Presidents-elect. American power, once a trump card, is now a wild card. Instead of a superpower that wants to impose stability and values on a fractious and valueless global order, the U.S. has become the single biggest source of international uncertainty. And don't expect lawmakers to provide the traditional set of checks and balances. It's not just that the Constitution gives the President great power to conduct foreign policy. It's also that Trump has succeeded politically where his party's establishment has continually failed, and as long as he remains popular with the party's voters, many junior Republican lawmakers will answer to their President rather than to their leaders on Capitol Hill. Expect Trump to use the bully pulpit with a vengeance, often at 140 characters or less, to try to set new rules and rally the faithful to follow his lead. As for special interests, Trump isn't much beholden to Wall Street, Silicon Valley or Big Business, since most didn't support him. Those in the tech class, in particular, are the most liberal of the U.S. business elite, and Trump's intense criticism of Apple for resisting FBI efforts to hack into the cell phones used by the attackers in San Bernardino, Calif., previews plenty of fights to come between the Trump White House and Silicon Valley. Trump has essentially charged Big Business with treason and threatens to punish--individually--those companies that ship jobs overseas. He hasn't yet taken the oath of office, but Trump (and Trumpism) have already begun to create turmoil abroad. In Europe, the new President's full embrace of Brexit sets teeth on edge in many capitals, and his friendly approach to Russia leaves European governments scrambling for security alternatives to NATO. Transatlantic relations have reached their lowest point since the 1930s. In Asia, his confrontational attitude toward China will bolster U.S. ties with allies like Japan and India that have long-term reasons to resist China's rise, but it has already made it that much harder to manage Washington's relations with Beijing, the most important relationship for the future of the global economy. It will also complicate any bid by the U.S. and China to work together, or at least in parallel, when North Korea finally becomes a red-alert-level emergency--which it almost certainly will. But the election of Donald Trump is just the latest source of G-zero uncertainty and turmoil. Few leaders in today's world, particularly in Europe, have enough popularity to get anything done, and the current wave of populism sweeping through many E.U. countries calls into question the legitimacy of institutions and governing principles in the world's most advanced industrial democracies. France will head to the polls in 2017, led by a President too weak to stand in an election in which a leading contender wants to pull the country out of the E.U. In Britain, with European negotiators and members of her own party intent on driving exceptionally hard bargains, it's far from clear that Prime Minister Theresa May can navigate her divided country through (at least) two years of Brexit negotiations. In Germany, the lack of any appealing alternative will probably keep Angela Merkel as Chancellor, but domestic backlash against her open-door policy for Middle East migrants will leave her much weakened. In Italy, the failure of Matteo Renzi's political-reform referendum has upended politics, dooming the country's 64th government in 70 years. Greece's financial problems are far from finished. The E.U. is in for a rough ride in 2017, even if its deal with Turkey to sharply limit the surge of Syrian refugees into Europe holds, helping avoid a repeat of the tidal wave of desperate people that roiled E.U. politics. While there are places where the risk is overblown, the outlook isn't much brighter in the developing world. The latest round of tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has made headlines, but both governments want to avoid an escalation of violence that might hurt them at home. In Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country, the capital city's Christian governor has aroused Muslim fury, but President Joko Widodo continues to promote economic reform and much-needed investment in the country's infrastructure. China's top leaders have become increasingly confident in their ability to maintain their monopoly on domestic political power and to develop stronger international relationships with willing partners. But a scheduled leadership transition next fall might create much higher levels of stress in Beijing and a more belligerent attitude from its leaders--particularly if China's economy begins to show unexpected vulnerability. With that backdrop, Trump's hostile approach, including treating U.S. policy on Taiwan as a card to play, will generate anxiety. Vladimir Putin remains firmly in charge in Moscow, and Trump's win provides an unexpected bonus in better relations with the White House. We might even see an easing, if not an end, of Western sanctions in 2017. But oil prices won't reach the heights that boosted the Russian economy a decade ago, which exposes a longer-term vulnerability for which Putin has no credible answer. He has more than enough political and financial capital to avoid serious trouble in 2017, but the long-term erosion of Russia's power and financial reserves will eventually give Putin good reasons to create international distractions. In Mexico, hostility toward (and from) Trump is already stirring up trouble. And economic crisis and political confrontation are headed toward a potentially violent climax in Venezuela. Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a would-be Putin bent on expanding his authority, has expressed growing hostility toward E.U. leaders who depend on his goodwill to limit migrant flows. South Africa's scandal-plagued President continues to ignite partisan passions. Protests, a staple of the country's political culture, have again turned violent. No region feels the G-zero pressure more acutely than the Middle East. In Saudi Arabia, low oil prices, Iran's release from sanctions, a lack of reliable friends and rivalries within the royal family are creating ever higher levels of stress. The killing continues in Yemen and in Syria, where Bashar Assad has all but conquered Aleppo. Finally, the military defeat of ISIS will scatter surviving fighters across the Middle East, North Africa, East Africa, Southeast Asia, Europe, Russia and elsewhere in search of opportunities to wage jihad on new battlefields. While America's withdrawal will create uncertainty, no one is rushing in to fill the vacuum. China's investments in Asia, Africa and Latin America boost Beijing's influence in dozens of countries, and Trump's renunciation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an enormous trade deal, gives China an excellent opportunity to expand its web of regional trade ties. But Beijing can't match Washington's military reach or cultural appeal. It's not a major producer of energy, food or the latest advanced technology. And China's leaders have their hands full at home. They must ensure that the nation's economy continues to develop and modernize to maintain their monopoly of domestic political power. The reality is that there is no emerging power ready, willing and able to take the leadership role the U.S. will no longer play. Around the world, populism will decentralize power away from central state actors toward local officials, at the expense of international cooperation. This anger undermines the authority of supranational organizations--the E.U., NATO, the U.N. The pace of technological change threatens the ability of governments to govern. An ever growing number of major decisions are taken by nonstate actors--data-hungry companies, hackers, political interest groups and terrorists. The international order itself is unraveling. In the past eight years alone, the world has seen the worst financial crisis in decades, a global recession, a historic debt crisis in the euro zone, a wave of unrest across North Africa and the Middle East, civil war in Syria, a migrant crisis that calls into question the future of Europe's open borders, war between Russia and Ukraine, Brexit, an explosion of cyber aggression and the election as U.S. President of one Donald Trump. Call it geopolitical creative destruction or just the sound of things falling apart, but the grinding of G-zero gears has become too loud to ignore. In the short term, 2017 will have more than its share of decisive political moments. France will stage the most anticipated presidential election in years this spring, with the country's future as a European pillar at stake. Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Front hopes to ride Europe's populist wave toward victory--and sound the death knell for the entire E.U. project. In the fall, Merkel, the last-standing champion of Western liberal values, seeks re-election as Germany's Chancellor. Both countries fear that Russian hackers will try to disrupt their elections, just as Moscow is suspected of having done in the U.S. There will also be a presidential election in Iran that might well bring tensions between reformers and hard-liners in that country to a head. Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and others will continue to seek solutions to the existential threat posed to their economies by persistently low oil prices. Angry words between Europe and Turkey will threaten a new surge of migrants across E.U. borders. China's leadership transition will make Beijing a more unpredictable player in regional and international politics. And President Donald Trump will lead the United States of America into uncharted waters.

Military power is unsustainable. Trying to expand power when it’s failing triggers resentment, which link turns their offense.

Maher 11 – Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department at Brown University

(Richard, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, world politics has been unipolar, defined by American preponderance in each of the core components of state power—military, economic, and technological. Such an imbalanced distribution of power in favor of a single country is unprecedented in the modern state system. This material advantage does not automatically translate into America’s preferred political and diplomatic outcomes, however. Other states, if now only at the margins, are challenging U.S. power and authority. Additionally, on a range of issues, the United States is finding it increasingly difficult to realize its goals and ambitions. The even bigger challenge for policymakers in Washington is how to respond to signs that America’s unquestioned preeminence in international politics is waning. This decline in the United States’ relative position is in part a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the U.S. position both internationally and domestically may actually be strengthened once this period of unipolarity has passed. On pure material terms, the gap between the United States and the rest of the world is indeed vast. The U.S. economy, with a GDP of over $14 trillion, is nearly three times the size of China’s, now the world’s second-largest national economy. The United States today accounts for approximately 25 percent of global economic output, a figure that has held relatively stable despite steadily increasing economic growth in China, India, Brazil, and other countries. Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent. When one takes discretionary spending into account, the United States today spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. This imbalance is even further magnified by the fact that five of the next seven biggest spenders are close U.S. allies. China, the country often seen as America’s next great geopolitical rival, has a defense budget that is one-seventh of what the United States spends on its military. There is also a vast gap in terms of the reach and sophistication of advanced weapons systems. By some measures, the United States spends more on research and development for its military than the rest of the world combined. What is remarkable is that the United States can do all of this without completely breaking the bank. The United States today devotes approximately 4 percent of GDP to defense. As a percentage of GDP, the United States today spends far less on its military than it did during the Cold War, when defense spending hovered around 10 percent of gross economic output. As one would expect, the United States today enjoys unquestioned preeminence in the military realm. No other state comes close to having the capability to project military power like the United States.1 And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America’s growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America’s closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil’s growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America’s vast power is not translating into America’s preferred outcomes. As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one’s preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one’s predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one’s friends just as much as in one’s rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily American predominance that produces unease but rather American predominance. Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries’ own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country’s economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America’s own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one’s role and purpose is acceptable and one’s power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics. As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America’s position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the ‘‘post-unipolar’’ world.

## Part 4 is Theory

1. All theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard- the most recent empirics of late elim rounds show huge neg side bias

Adler 15, Are Judges Just Guessing? A Statistical Analysis of LD Elimination Round Panels by Steven Adler http://nsdupdate.com/2015/03/30/are-judges-just-guessing-a-statistical-analysis-of-ld-elimination-round-panels-by-steven-adler/

Yet a plausible objection here might be that maybe the elimination round data need to be further segmented. For instance, perhaps the data do not meet this randomization because judges can easily distinguish between winners and losers in early elimination rounds, which typically contain more-lopsided matchups, but that in late elimination rounds the decision is much murkier. In fact, I find some support for this hypothesis, though it may be an artifact of a smaller sample-size for this segment.To evaluate this hypothesis, I replicated the above analysis, but pared down to the 36 coded rounds that took place in quarterfinals or later. In these rounds, the Neg side-bias was even more pronounced, with Neg winning 61% of elimination rounds, so the ‘expected’ randomization rate on ballots to achieve such an overall win-rate would be 57% for the Neg and 43% for the Aff. This creates the following expected distribution, compared to the actual observed distribution for these late elimination rounds:

2. Vote aff if I win a counter-interp

a. AFF flex – negative has the ability to win on either layer so the aff needs the same ability in the 2ar. 2AR is too short to win a new shell and play defense against the 2NR theory arguments so the AFF needs reciprocal layers rather than adding more unreciprocal avenues. That’s not a problem in the long 2nr.

b. reciprocity- Only the neg can read T because only the aff has a burden to be topical. Thus the aff needs an RVI to compensate for the neg’s unique avenue to the ballot.

3.Evaluate aff theory lexically prior to neg theory- the neg has the ability to win their shell and beat back the aff shell in the long 2NR, whereas it’s impossible for me to beat back their shell and my shell in the short 2AR. The 2NR explodes neg’s strategic options, but aff needs to sit down on one arg to win in the 2AR. Prefer this weighing

a. its about the structure of aff and neg so it applies to more rounds and is best for setting norms

b. comes on the highest layer- it proves you cannot fairly determine the truth of the 2nr shell because I don’t have adequate time to respond to it. Thus all size of link questions are skewed.

## Part 5 is Method

1. The aff deploys a heuristic to learn scenario planning- even if politics and colleges are bad, scenario analysis of policies is pedagogically valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills

Barma et al 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>)

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

2. Use epistemic modesty to evaluate the method debate- key to decision-making, in all other circumstances we use probability times magnitude to evaluate risk, that’s the definition of game theory. It would be inconsistent to do that here as well.

3. Contesting the policy focus on the AC is bad, prefer the AC framework as long as it is theoretically legitimate.

A: it moots 6 minutes of AC offense since it uplayers my offense, which destroys aff, ground.

B: Also means the neg never has to clash and engage with the aff which means they get superficial education.

C: Coopts all their offense- they can read their role of the ballot when their aff.

4. Aff isn’t roleplaying- I’m not pretending that I am the state, I am merely forming an opinion about what the state should do. For example, I can say that criminal ought not murder people without thinking that I am that criminal. Avoids the link and non-unique your offense, everyone forms opinions about the government.

5. We should focus on particular circumstances which best tackle material violence.

Pappas 16, Gregory Fernando, The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016

In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these problematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to practice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.

6. Root cause explanations of politics don’t exist- methodological pluralism is key to open up new ideas and avoid violence.

Bleiker 14 – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)

For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences.

## Versus K Debaters

## Part 1 is Framing

Debate cannot be a discussion of ideal theory- it must be a discussion of tangible policies to reduce oppression.

Curry 14, Tommy, The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century, Victory Briefs, 2014,

Despite the pronouncement of **debate** as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. ¶ This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

Thus the standard is minimizing oppression.

## Part 2 is Advocacy

Plan text, Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict constitutionally protected speech that criticizes the military’s policies.

## Part 3 is Offense

Patriotic Correctness on campuses runs rampant- dissent is charged with treason and lines of critical thought are silenced. Higher education has been coopted by the military industrial complex, reducing the roles of teachers to mere technicians. Members of college campuses are routinely fired if they criticize the military, causing a chilling effect on such discussion. Multiple empirical examples prove:

Wilson 15, John K., Ph.D candidate with dissertation on the history of academic freedom in America and author of three books, “Patriotic Correctness: Academic Freedom and Its Enemies,” Routledge, Nov 30, 2015

Compared to earlier “wartime” situations, academic freedom is far more protected today than at any time in the past. But the danger posed to academic freedom cannot be ignored. Efforts to silence faculty and students, even when they are unsuccessful, can make others around the country more reluctant to speak openly. Only by denouncing all efforts at censorship and vigorously defending the right of freedom on college campuses, can we continue to protect academic freedom. The cliché of our times, constantly repeated but often true, is that 9/11 “changed everything.” One thing that it changed was academic freedom. The controversy over the limits of free speech on college campuses across the nation began immediately. On the morning of September 11, 2001, University of New Mexico history professor Richard Berthold joked with his class, “Anyone who would blow up the Pentagon would have my vote.” Berthold received death threats, keeping him off campus. On September 27, an unidentified person left a message on the provost’s voice-mail saying if Berthold were not “ousted” within 24 hours, Berthold would be ousted by other sources. Berthold was threatened in front of his home by a biker who came at him screaming obscenities, and he received several angry e-mails and letters with messages such as “I’d like to blow you up.” New Mexico state representative William Fuller declared,“Treason is giving aide or comfort to the enemy. Any terrorist who heard Berthold’s comment was comforted.” In the end, Berthold was pressured to retire from his job because of those 11 words he spoke on 9/11.Mohammad Rahat, an Iranian citizen and University of Miami medical technician who turned 22 years old on September 11, 2001, declared in a meeting that day, “Some birthday gift from Osama bin Laden.” Although Rahat said that he meant it “in a sarcastic way,” Rahat was suspended and then fired on September 25, 2001. Paula Musto, vice president of university relations, declared that Rahat’s “comments were deeply disturbing to his co-workers and superiors at the medical school. They were inappropriate and unbecoming for someone working in a research laboratory. He was fired because he made those comments, certainly not because of his ethnic background.” Rahat had received only positive evaluation in 13 months working in the lab. 6 At the University of California at Los Angeles, library assistant Jonnie Hargis was suspended without pay for one week after sending an e-mail response criticizing American policies in Iraq and Israel. Hargis’ union successfully pursued a grievance; Hargis was repaid for his lost income, the incident was stricken from his job record, and the university was forced to clarify its e-mail policies.7On September 13, 2001, two resident assistants in Minnesota complained to the dean of students that undergraduates felt fearful and uneasy because some professors questioned the competence of the Bush Administration. According to the resident assistants,“The recent attacks extend beyond political debate, and for professors to make negative judgments on our government before any action has taken place only fosters a cynical attitude in the classroom.” The administration asked faculty to think hard about what they said. Greg Kneser, dean of students, declared:“There were students who were just scared, and an intellectual discussion of the political ramifications of this was not helpful for them. They were frightened, and they look to their faculty not just for intellectual debate” but as “people they trust.”8 Even hypothetical discussions were suspicious. Portland Community College philosophy professor Stephen Carey challenged students in his critical thinking class to consider an extreme rhetorical proposition that would cause great emotion, like “Bush should be hung, strung up upside down, and left for the buzzards.” One student’s mother, misunderstanding the example, called the FBI and accused Carey of threatening to kill the President, and the Secret Service investigated him.9 When four leftist faculty at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill (UNC) criticized U.S. foreign policy at a teach-in, Scott Rubush of FrontPage magazine, declared, “They’re using state resources to the practical effect of aiding and abetting the Taliban.”The magazine recommended that these faculty be fired. “Tell the good folks at UNC–Chapel Hill what you think of their decision to allow anti-American rallies on their state-supported campus,” FrontPage urged. The administration received hundreds of angry e-mails, and was denounced on the floor of the North Carolina legislature. Several antiwar faculty members received death threats.10 In addition to phys i cal threats and attack s , A rab and Muslim students also faced enormous scru t i ny from the authori t i e s . An October 2001 survey by the Am e ri can Association of Collegiate Registrars and Ad m i s s i ons Officers found thatat least 220 colleges had been contacted by law enforcement in the weeks after 9/11. Police or FBI agents made 99 requests for private “n on - d i re c t o ry ”i n f o rm a t i on ,s u ch as course sch e d u l e s , that under law cannot be released without student con s e n t , a s u b p o e n a , or a pending danger (on ly 12 of the requests had a subpoena, a l t h o u g h the Immigra t i on and Na t u ra l i za t i on Se rvice doesn’t re q u i reconsent for inform a t i on on foreign students). Most requests were for individual students, although 16 requests for student re c o rds were “based on ethnicity. ” Law enforcement re c e i ve d the inform a t i on from 159 sch o o l s , and on ly eight denied any re q u e s t s . I n response to the violence and persecution against Muslim and Arab students, some colleges did try to restrict offensive speech in ways that resulted in threats to academic fre e d om . At Orange Coast Com mu n i ty College (OCC) on September 20, 2001, government professor Ken Hearlson was suspended for 11 weeks after Muslim students accused him of being biased against them and calling them “terrorists.” Hearlson denied the accusation. A tape recording of the class found that the most extreme statements were misheard, although Hearlson did apparently point a finger at Middle Eastern students while he blamed Arab countries for fomenting terrorism.11 In a case at Johns Hopkins University, Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), was demoted (but later reinstated) after a September 14 panel discussion on terrorism in which he criticized Iraq, Pakistan, and Palestinians.12 I n response to the violence and persecution against Muslim and Arab students, some colleges did try to restrict offensive speech in ways that resulted in threats to academic fre e d om . At Orange Coast Com mu n i ty College (OCC) on September 20, 2001, government professor Ken Hearlson was suspended for 11 weeks after Muslim students accused him of being biased against them and calling them “terrorists.” Hearlson denied the accusation. A tape recording of the class found that the most extreme statements were misheard, although Hearlson did apparently point a finger at Middle Eastern students while he blamed Arab countries for fomenting terrorism.11 In a case at Johns Hopkins University, Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), was demoted (but later reinstated) after a September 14 panel discussion on terrorism in which he criticized Iraq, Pakistan, and Palestinians.12 Anti-military views expressed in an e-mail could put a professor’s job at risk. At Chicago’s St. Xavier University, history professor Peter Kirstein sent this response to an Air Force cadet asking him to help promote an Air Force event: “You are a disgrace to this country and I am furious you would even think I would support you and your aggressive baby killing tactics of collateral damage.” Although Kirstein apologized for his e-mail, many called for his dismissal. On November 15, 2002, St. Xavier president Richard Yanikoski announced that Kirstein would be immediately suspended, receive a reprimand, and undergo a post-tenure review during a Spring 2003 sabbatical.13 Another tenured professor was suspended for responding rudely to an unsolicited e-mail and saying that killing is wrong. While conservatives contended that a few cases of censorship proved that left-wing thought police rule over college campuses, my extensive survey of academic freedom and civil liberties at American universities found the opposite: left-wing critics of the Bush Administration suffered by far the most numerous and most serious violations of their civil liberties. Censorship of conservatives was rare, and almost always overturned in the few cases where it occurred. Patriotic correctness—not political correctness—reigned supreme after 9/11.

2 impacts

### A. Cultural shift-

The aff teaches students to refuse the myth of militarism- this creates a cultural shift away from the glorification of violence

Chatterjee & Maira 14 [Piya Chatterjee, Backstrand Chair and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Scripps College, Sunaina Maira, Professor of Asian American Studies at UC Davis, “The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent,” University of Minnesota Press, 2014] JW

State warfare and militarism have shored up deeply powerful notions of patriotism, intertwined with a politics of race, class, gender, sexuality, and religion , through the culture wars that have embroiled the U.S. academy. The fronts of “hot” and “cold” wars—military, cultural, and academic— have rested on an ideological framework that has defined the “enemy” as a threat to U.S. freedom and democracy. This enemy produced and propped up in the shifting culture wars— earlier the Communist, now the (Muslim) terrorist— has always been both external and internal. The overt policing of knowledge production, exemplified by right-wing groups such as ACTA, reveals an ideological battle cry in the “culture wars” that have burgeoned in the wake of the civil rights movement— and the containment and policing demanded within the academy. Defending the civilizational integrity of the nation requires producing a national subject and citizen by regulating the boundaries of what is permissible and desirable to express in national culture— and in the university. As Readings observed, “In modernity, the University becomes the model of the social bond that ties individuals in a common relation to the idea of the nation-state.” 46 Belonging is figured through the metaphor of patriotic citizenship, in the nation and in the academy, through displays of what Henry Giroux has also called “patriotic correctness”: “an ideology that privileges conformity over critical learning and that represents dissent as something akin to a terrorist act.” 47 This is where the recent culture wars have shaped the politics of what we call academic containment. For right-wing activists, the nation must be fortified by an educational foundation that upholds, at its core, the singular superiority of Western civilization. A nation-state construed as being under attack is in a state of cultural crisis where any sign of disloyalty to the nation is an act of treachery, including acts perceived as intellectual betrayal. The culture wars have worked to uphold a powerful mythology about American democracy and the American Dream and a potent fiction about freedom of expression that in actuality contains academic dissent. This exceptionalist mythology has historically represented the U.S. nation as a beacon of individual liberty and a bulwark against the Evil Empire or Communist bloc ; Third Worldist and left insurgent movements, including uprisings within the United States in the 1960s and 1970s and in Central America in the 1980s; Islamist militancy and anti-imperial movements since the 1980s ; and the threat posed by all of these to the American “way of life.” The battle against Communism, anti-imperial Third Worldism, and so-called Islamofascism entailed regulating and containing movements sympathetic to these forces at home, including intellectuals with left-leaning tendencies and radical scholars or students— all those likely to contaminate young minds and indoctrinate students in “subversive” or “anti-American” ideologies.

Militarism is part of the culture, making people disposable- justifying and creating everyday violence against the Middle Eastern Other. The aff allows student and professors to refuse this culture.

Chatterjee & Maira 2 [Piya Chatterjee, Backstrand Chair and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Scripps College, Sunaina Maira, Professor of Asian American Studies at UC Davis, “The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent,” University of Minnesota Press, 2014] JW

The strategic co-optation of the language of pluralism for academic containment is nowhere more evident than in the assault on progressive scholarship in Middle East studies and postcolonial studies and in the intense culture wars over Islam, the War on Terror, and Israel-Palestine. The 9/ 11 attacks and the heightened Islamophobia they generated allowed Zionist and neoconservative groups to intensify accusations that progressive Middle East studies scholars and scholars critical of U.S. foreign policy were guilty of bias and “ one-sided” partisanship , as observed in accounts of censure, suspicion, and vilification by Abowd, De Genova, and Salaita. The post-9/ 11 culture wars conjured up new and not-sonew phantoms of enemies— in particular , the racialized specter of the “terrorist.” This figure, and the racial panic associated with it, has been sedimented in the national imaginary as synonymous with the “Muslim” and the “Arab” since the Iranian Revolution of 1978– 1979 and the First Intifada against Israeli occupation in the late 1980s. The War on Terror consolidated Orientalist caricatures of Muslim fanatics and Arab militants , but it is important to note that these also dredged up avatars of a historical logic of containment and annihilation of indigenous others. 59 The native, the barbarian, and the foreigner converge in this cultural imaginary that legitimizes violence against anti-Western, uncivilized regions incapable of democratic self-governance and that is produced by expert knowledge of other peoples and regions. The wars in Iraq and “Af-Pak” and the global hunt for terrorists entailed an intensified suspicion and scrutiny of ideologies that supported militant resistance or “anti-American” sentiments and necessitated academic research on communities that were supposedly “breeding grounds” for terrorism. The post-9/ 11 panic about Muslim terrorists and enemy aliens increasingly focused on the threat of “homegrown terrorism” as the War on Terror shifted its focus to “radicalized” communities within the United States, especially Muslim American youth. At the same time, as Godrej observes, the criminalization of those considered threats to national security has included the violent repression of Occupy activists and student protesters and indefinite detention authorized by the PATRIOT (Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act and the National Defense Authorization Act. Protests focused on higher education thus blur into dissent against U.S. warfare and the homeland security state in a climate of heightened campus securitization and university collaboration with the FBI in the interest of “public safety.” Anarchists are considered domestic terror threats to be contained, and Muslim or Arab American students (or faculty) who are also anarchists are subjected to multiple levels of containment and scrutiny, as suggested in the chapter by Falcón et al. Academic containment is clearly part of a larger politics of repression and policing in the national security state that affects faculty and students as well as the campus climate in general.

This militaristic mindset is used to squash movements

Gossett 14Lambda Literary Writer Retreat Fellow, black genderqueer and femme fabulous activist and writer (Che, “We will not rest in peace AIDS activism, black radicalism, queer and/or trans resistance,” Queer Necropolitics, Edited by Jim Haritaworn, Adi Kuntsman, and Silvia Posocco, Q Routledge

The prison industrial complex is an always already anti-black, violently antiqueer and anti-transgender enterprise that perpetuates what Saidiya Hartman names the ‘afterlife of slavery’ (Hartman 2008: 6). It institutionalizes forms of restricted life: following ‘re-entry’, a formerly incarcerated person loses access to public housing, benefits and federal educational loans and faces chronic joblessness due to stigma. Incarceration has been historically employed as a means of maintaining an anti-black and white supremacist sociopolitical and racial capitalist order from antebellum ‘black codes’ that criminalized vagrancy (Dru Stanley 125 126) post-‘emancipation’, to more recent attempts to extinguish the spirit and destroy the momentum of black liberationist movements in the United States (ranging from surveillance and sabotage of the Revolutionary Action Movement, to COINTELPRO, to the current renewed targeting of Assata Shakur). Journalist Shane Bauer (2012) has documented how in California, the mere possession of black radical literature results in being criminalized as gang related and put in solitary housing units (SHU) - a form of torture from which exit is uncertain, whose administration is often based on whether one informs on other incarcerated people (Bauer 2012: 1-4). Prisons thus continue the logic of COINTELPRO, which aimed to neutralize and eliminate black freedom movement(s). The prison industrial complex is at once a manifestation of a disciplinary and of a control society. The prison is one of the central and proliferating oppressive technologies through which bio- and necropolitical violence and the apparatuses of surveillance that reinforce it are naturalized. The insidious morphology of the carceral is such that even as it is dismantled via lobbying for decriminalization and decarceration, on the one hand, it proliferates via extended modes of surveillance and control — ankle bracelets, probation and parole — on the other. Carceral violence is maintained in various penal registers and forms.

### B. Political Spillover

Academics have used state resources and their own academic freedom to create positive policy change proving that liberalizing the university creates concrete material impacts

Slaughter 88 [Sheila Slaughter, associate professor in the Center for the Study of Higher Education and director of the Division of Educational Foundations and Administration, The University of Arizona, “Academic Freedom and the State: Reflections on the Uses of Knowledge,” The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 59, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1988), pp. 241-262] JW

In the 1960s and 1970s, definitions of academic knowledge began to broaden. The university curriculum came to include subjects previously treated only in an incidental way-black studies, women's stud- ies, ethnic studies, and multiculturalism. Even China studies reentered the curriculum. The works of Marxists, feminists, anar- chists, and critical thinkers were included in social science courses where more conventional thought had once dominated. Methodologi- cal debates raged: the very possibility of objective knowledge and value-free science was seriously questioned [20, 38]. The expanded, heavily state-funded university provided in large part the resource base for the growth of diverse forms of knowledge. Funds were available for the new departments and new courses, jour- nals, and library subscriptions. Professors were able to sustain these new areas with resources generated within the university. Professors representing broader forms of knowledge were able to make their presence felt in professional associations, many of which developed radical and feminist caucuses in the late 1960s and 1970s [9, 36]. Professors engaged in generating alternative forms of knowledge also exchanged expertise with those outside the university, often using the university as their primary resource base. These external groups contributed symbolic support, some resources and very often used professors' expertise to fuel reform. Professors developing expertise in complementarity with these groups usually offer ideological and technical alternatives to current policy. In the area of foreign policy, for example, professors have worked with a wide variety of external groups to curb United States interventionist policies in Central America, particularly in Nicaragua. In many cases, these groups do more than simply call for an end to war; they present carefully thought-out policy alternatives for the region. Thus, the Institute for Policy Stud- ies drew on a number of professors in writing Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America. A great many professors have endorsed this long-term development plan for the Caribbean Basin. Academics have exchanged expertise with the Institute for Food and Development Policy in attempts to help Central American countries become self-sustaining in terms of food production. organizations such as Americas Watch and Amnesty International of- fer resources for new forms of expertise in Central America as do religious organizations such as Witness for Peace and Pledge of Resis- tance. Central America is only a single instance. State-supported professors exchange expertise with a wide variety of external groups trying to change prevailing policy. Examples of such exchanges are seen in professorial work with critical intellectual centers such as Public In- terest Research Groups, the Council on Economic Priorities, and the Union for Radical Political Economics; with special interest groups such as nuclear disarmament and pro-choice organizations; and with religious groups trying to create new theologies.

## Part 4 is Theory

1. All theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard- the most recent empirics of late elim rounds show huge neg side bias

Adler 15, Are Judges Just Guessing? A Statistical Analysis of LD Elimination Round Panels by Steven Adler http://nsdupdate.com/2015/03/30/are-judges-just-guessing-a-statistical-analysis-of-ld-elimination-round-panels-by-steven-adler/

Yet a plausible objection here might be that maybe the elimination round data need to be further segmented. For instance, perhaps the data do not meet this randomization because judges can easily distinguish between winners and losers in early elimination rounds, which typically contain more-lopsided matchups, but that in late elimination rounds the decision is much murkier. In fact, I find some support for this hypothesis, though it may be an artifact of a smaller sample-size for this segment.To evaluate this hypothesis, I replicated the above analysis, but pared down to the 36 coded rounds that took place in quarterfinals or later. In these rounds, the Neg side-bias was even more pronounced, with Neg winning 61% of elimination rounds, so the ‘expected’ randomization rate on ballots to achieve such an overall win-rate would be 57% for the Neg and 43% for the Aff. This creates the following expected distribution, compared to the actual observed distribution for these late elimination rounds:

2. Vote aff if I win a counter-interp

a. AFF flex – negative has the ability to win on either layer so the aff needs the same ability in the 2ar. 2AR is too short to win a new shell and play defense against the 2NR theory arguments so the AFF needs reciprocal layers rather than adding more unreciprocal avenues. That’s not a problem in the long 2nr.

b. reciprocity- Only the neg can read T because only the aff has a burden to be topical. Thus the aff needs an RVI to compensate for the neg’s unique avenue to the ballot.

3. Theory paradigm issues

a. No Neg RVI as long as the 1ar does not read more than 2 shells- It stops theory from checking abuse because you can collapse for 6 minutes in the 2nr to the counter-interp and brute force your norm

b. Drop the debater- 1ar is too short to have a fair shot at substance and theory, which means if theory is drop the arg it destroys theory as resource since I lose a time-trade off for checking abuse.

## Part 5 is Method

1. The aff deploys a heuristic to learn scenario planning- even if politics and colleges are bad, scenario analysis of policies is pedagogically valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills

Barma et al 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>)

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

2. Use epistemic modesty to evaluate the method debate- that’s probability of the framework being true times the magnitude of the offense underneath it. That’s key to decision-making, in all other circumstances we use probability times magnitude to evaluate risk, that’s the definition of game theory. It would be inconsistent to do that here as well.

3. Contesting the policy focus on the AC is bad, prefer the AC framework as long as it is theoretically legitimate.

A: it moots 6 minutes of AC offense since it uplayers my offense, which destroys aff, ground.

B: Also means the neg never has to clash and engage with the aff which means they get superficial education.

C: Coopts all their offense- they can read their role of the ballot when their aff.

4. Oppression is a concrete problem that demands a concrete solution.

Cone 10, James. [Professor of Systematic Theology, Union Theological Seminary]. A Black Theology of Liberation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010

Participation in divine liberation places the church squarely in the context of the world. It s existence is inseparable from worldly involvement. Black theology cannot say that the “church is the world” or “the world is the church” (as implied in some secular theologies), but it does affirm that the church cannot be the church in isolation from the concrete realities of human suffering**.** The world is earthly existence, the place where human beings are enslaved. It is where laws are passed against the oppressed, and where the oppressed fight back even though their efforts seem futile. The world is where white and black persons live, encountering each other, the latter striving for a little more room to breathe and the former doing everything possible to destroy black reality.¶ The world is not a metaphysical entity or an ontological problem, as some philosophers and theologians would have us believe it is very concrete. It is punching clocks, taking orders, fighting rats, and being kicked around by police officers.it is where the oppressed live. Jews encountered it in concentration camps, Amerindians on reservations, and blacks on slave ships, in cotton fields, and in “dark” ghettos. The world is white persons, the degrading rules they make are for the “underprivileged”, and their guilt dispelling recourse to political and theological slogans about the welfare of society “ as a whole”. In short, the world is where the brutal reality of inhumanity makes its ungodly appearance, turning persons into animals**.**

5. We should focus on particular circumstances which best tackle material violence, root cause explanations are bad.

Pappas 16, Gregory Fernando, The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016

In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these problematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to practice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.

6. Aff isn’t roleplaying- I’m not pretending that I am the state, I am merely forming an opinion about what the state should do. For example, I can say that criminal ought not murder people without thinking that I am that criminal. Avoids the link and non-unique your offense, everyone forms opinions about the government.

7. Root cause explanations of politics don’t exist- methodological pluralism is key to open up new ideas and avoid violence.

Bleiker 14 – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)

For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences.